Last Updated 17/05/2026 published 17/05/2026 by Hans Smedema

Transnational Human Rights Violations, International Treaty Body Findings, and the Limits of European Union Competence: An Analytical Report

1. Introduction and Constitutional Framework

The intersection of supranational European Union (EU) law and international human rights law presents an extraordinarily complex jurisdictional landscape, characterized by inherent tensions between state sovereignty, the principle of conferred powers, and the universal mandate to protect fundamental human rights. A recurring point of profound legal friction emerges when victims of alleged state-sponsored human rights violations appeal to EU institutions—namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Ombudsman—only to encounter an impenetrable procedural blockade. The standard institutional response relies heavily on the doctrine of subsidiarity and the strict delineation of competences, framing the alleged abuses as a purely “internal matter” of the Member State in question, thereby purportedly placing the issue completely outside the legal and regulatory competence of the European Union.1

This analytical report critically examines the legal viability, durability, and ultimate vulnerability of this “internal matter” defense in the face of escalating international legal action. The specific analytical paradigm driving this examination involves a citizen alleging a highly complex, fifty-year ordeal of sustained human rights violations within the Netherlands. The allegations within this paradigm include claims of profound psychological torture, systemic institutional gaslighting, the weaponization of psychiatric diagnoses to discredit testimony, and the active complicity of police, judicial, and state intelligence apparatuses in orchestrating a decades-long cover-up.4 This paradigm has recently evolved through the deliberate introduction of a cross-border, transnational element, resulting in the filing of two separate, interconnected communications before the United Nations Committee Against Torture (UNCAT): one against the Netherlands (filed in November 2025) and a subsequent communication against the Kingdom of Spain (filed in May 2026) concerning questions of admissibility, extraterritoriality, and state responsibility in exile.4

The central inquiry of this comprehensive analysis is twofold. First, the analysis assesses whether the mere procedural fact of having filed twin, transnational UNCAT complaints alters the legal calculus sufficiently to override the EU Commission’s persistent reliance on the “internal problem” defense. Second, the analysis meticulously delineates the precise legal, procedural, evidentiary, and political thresholds that must be met to legally compel—or “force”—the European Union to abandon its posture of non-intervention and initiate aggressive enforcement actions, such as systemic infringement proceedings or Article 7 TEU interventions, against a Member State for protracted, structural human rights violations.7

2. The Jurisdictional Architecture: Subsidiarity, Conferral, and the “Internal Matter” Doctrine

To accurately assess whether pending UNCAT complaints can successfully breach the EU’s jurisdictional shield, it is first necessary to dissect the architectural foundations of the European Union’s legal competence. The European Union is not a sovereign federal state with general police powers or a universal mandate to rectify domestic injustices; rather, it operates exclusively on the principle of conferral, as explicitly articulated in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).3 Under this principle, the EU may only act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union remain rigidly with the Member States.

2.1 The Scope and Limitations of the Charter of Fundamental Rights

The European Commission’s frequent, almost reflexive assertion that an individual human rights complaint constitutes an “internal problem” is firmly grounded in the text and subsequent judicial interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR).2 Article 51 explicitly dictates that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, and to the Member States “only when they are implementing Union law”.2

The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), notably established and refined in cases such as Åkerberg Fransson, clarifies that the applicability of EU fundamental rights is strictly and immutably tethered to the applicability of EU law.10 If a national authority commits an act of torture, engages in systemic corruption, perpetrates a cover-up, or facilitates judicial malfeasance in an area governed purely by domestic criminal, civil, or administrative law, the CFR is simply not triggered. The EU legal order does not automatically absorb all fundamental rights violations merely because they occur within the territorial boundaries of the Union. Consequently, the European Commission routinely and legally rejects complaints seeking individual redress, explicitly stating that it lacks the power to intervene in matters that do not directly involve the implementation or breach of cross-border EU legislation.1

This strict demarcation creates a phenomenon known in EU legal scholarship as “reverse discrimination” and the “purely internal rule”.14 Under this framework, situations confined entirely within a single Member State where EU law cannot be invoked leave citizens reliant solely on domestic legal protections, even if those domestic protections are entirely compromised, corrupt, or captured by hostile state actors.14

 

Jurisdictional Concept	Doctrinal Description	Impact on Individual Human Rights Redress
Principle of Conferral	The European Union can only act within the precise limits of the competences explicitly conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties (Article 5 TEU).3	Prevents the EU Commission and the CJEU from acting as a general appellate court or investigative body for domestic criminal or civil disputes.1
Article 51 CFR Constraint	Fundamental rights guarantees under the EU Charter apply to Member States exclusively when they are actively implementing or derogating from Union law.2	Domestic abuses, regardless of their severity or duration, are classified as “purely internal” unless demonstrably tied to a specific EU directive or regulation.11
The “Purely Internal” Rule	Legal situations lacking any cross-border element or nexus to the EU internal market, isolating the individual within the national legal framework.14	Creates a jurisdictional void where severe systemic abuses can persist with impunity if successfully isolated within national borders.14
Institutional Enforcement Mandate	The Commission’s role as Guardian of the Treaties under Article 258 TFEU is to ensure systemic compliance with EU law, not to provide individual compensation or redress.1	Individual complaints are routinely dismissed at the administrative level unless they can be utilized as evidence of a widespread, systemic failure to implement specific EU legislation.1

2.2 The Absolute Discretion of the Commission’s Enforcement Powers

Furthermore, even in scenarios where a tenuous link to EU law might arguably be established, the European Commission enjoys vast, nearly unreviewable discretion under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) regarding whether to initiate formal infringement proceedings.1 The Commission utilizes individual complaints primarily as a source of intelligence to detect systemic non-compliance, but it explicitly warns citizens that it is “largely free to decide if and when to launch an infringement procedure” and emphasizes that its primary purpose “is not to remedy individual problems”.1

The Commission has historically taken the position that isolated instances of possible wrongful application of EU law, which do not raise issues of general principle or lack evidence of a broader systemic shortcoming, are to be dealt with exclusively by national redress bodies.15 Therefore, from a strictly textual and procedural perspective, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Ombudsman are legally shielded when asserting that an individual’s 50-year ordeal with a domestic justice system is an “internal matter,” provided the state apparatus has successfully contained the ordeal within the parameters of domestic sovereignty and prevented it from intersecting with the execution of EU secondary legislation.1

3. The Transnational Dimension: Fracturing the “Purely Internal” Shield

The primary mechanism for bypassing the restrictive confines of Article 51 CFR and the purely internal rule is the introduction and substantiation of a definitive cross-border element. The paradigm case under analysis achieves this critical shift by involving an individual who has fled the primary jurisdiction (the Netherlands) and sought refuge, safety, or legal redress in a second Member State (Spain), resulting in the generation of two parallel, interconnected UNCAT complaints.4 This geographic and legal migration alters the fundamental nature of the conflict.

3.1 The Emergence of Transnational Repression and Cross-Border Obligations

The precise moment an alleged human rights violation, or the active cover-up thereof, crosses internal European Union borders, the legal classification of the act shifts fundamentally from domestic malfeasance to transnational repression. “Transnational repression” is legally defined as a phenomenon wherein a state reaches beyond its own territorial borders to intimidate, silence, coerce, or harm dissidents, human rights defenders, or exiled citizens living in other sovereign jurisdictions.17 Such practices encompass a wide spectrum of abuses, ranging from direct physical methods such as targeted violence and abduction, to the malicious abuse of legal tools including politically motivated extradition requests, to non-physical techniques such as digital surveillance, smear campaigns, and the exertion of diplomatic or consular pressure.18

If it is alleged, as in the paradigm case, that the apparatus of the Dutch state—or powerful actors protected by that state—extended their operations into the Kingdom of Spain to commit further abuses (such as alleged electroshock torture in exile, the manipulation of foreign medical professionals, or interference with international asylum procedures 4), the matter irrevocably ceases to be a purely internal problem of the Netherlands.19

The European Parliament has increasingly and forcefully recognized transnational repression as a direct, existential threat to the sovereignty and security of host states within the EU, as well as a severe violation of the fundamental rights of EU citizens, demanding a highly coordinated response at the European Union level.18 When two Member States become entangled in a single narrative of abuse, EU competences regarding the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (Title V TFEU), the foundational principles of the free movement of persons, and the architecture of mutual judicial cooperation are inherently and unavoidably activated. The European Union can no longer claim that the matter does not affect the internal market or the integrated security framework of the bloc.18

3.2 State Responsibility, Complicity, and Article 16 ARSIWA

Under the frameworks of international law, specifically Article 16 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), derived or complicit responsibility arises when a state aids or assists another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.23 If the Kingdom of Spain, whether through active administrative action or systemic omission, allegedly facilitates, tolerates, or fails in its positive obligation to protect an individual residing within its borders from the extraterritorial abuses orchestrated by the Netherlands, complex questions of joint and derived liability emerge.23

By strategically filing a second UNCAT complaint specifically targeting Spain regarding admissibility, protection failures, and state responsibility in exile 4, the applicant effectively forces a legal confrontation regarding the principle of mutual trust and judicial cooperation between EU Member States. Under EU law, the principle of mutual trust requires Member States to presume, save in highly exceptional circumstances, that all other Member States comply with fundamental rights and EU values.24 However, the CJEU has firmly ruled in landmark cases that this presumption is not absolute and can be rebutted in circumstances involving systemic deficiencies that expose individuals to a real and immediate risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, violating Article 4 CFR.25 The deliberate filing of twin international complaints creates a documented, structural transnational legal conflict, severely undermining the European Commission’s ability to dismiss the case as a solely domestic, single-state anomaly.14 It forces the EU to confront the reality that one of its Member States is allegedly utilizing the open borders of the Union to perpetrate abuse, while another Member State is allegedly failing in its sovereign duty to prevent it.

4. The Legal Weight and Jurisdictional Impact of UNCAT Findings on European Union Decision-Making

The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) stands as an absolute cornerstone of international human rights law, imposing strict, non-derogable obligations on its signatories.27 However, a significant jurisdictional nuance exists: the European Union itself, as a supranational organization, is not a direct signatory or party to UNCAT, although all twenty-seven of its individual Member States have ratified the instrument. This dynamic creates a complex, indirect mechanism of legal integration and accountability.

4.1 Do Pending UNCAT Complaints Override the EU’s Internal Matter Defense?

The preliminary legal reality that must be confronted is that the mere procedural act of filing a communication under Article 22 of UNCAT against the Netherlands and Spain 4 does not, in and of itself, automatically obligate the European Commission to abandon its jurisdictional boundaries or initiate enforcement proceedings. An international complaint, while initiating a formal dialogue and investigative process, does not function as a self-executing injunction capable of overriding EU subsidiarity.3 The Commission will likely maintain its stance of non-intervention while the international body deliberates.

However, the legal and political landscape alters exponentially if the United Nations Committee Against Torture concludes its investigation and issues a definitive View or Finding confirming that the Member States in question have indeed violated their obligations under the Convention. While the European Union is not technically bound by UNCAT decisions in the same direct, treaty-based manner as a signatory Member State, the EU is comprehensively bound by customary international law and the general principles of law, which unequivocally include the absolute, jus cogens prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.29

 

International Legal Concept	Jurisdictional Impact on EU Institutions	Treaty / Jurisprudential Source
Pending UNCAT Complaint	Minimal direct legal effect; the European Commission maintains broad discretion and subsidiarity defenses while investigations are ongoing.	Article 22 UNCAT; EU Subsidiarity Principles 3
Definitive UNCAT Finding of Violation	Triggers international state responsibility; forces the EU to structurally re-evaluate “mutual trust” presumptions in cross-border judicial and security cases.	Article 16 ARSIWA; Principle of Bona Fide interpretation 23
Jus Cogens Prohibition of Torture	Represents an absolute prohibition binding directly on the EU; overrides internal procedural barriers if EU funds, mutual recognition mechanisms, or cross-border laws are implicated in the abuse.	Customary International Law; Article 4 CFR 26
ECtHR Integration of UNTB Views	The European Court of Human Rights heavily relies on UN Treaty Body findings, directly shaping the subsequent interpretation of EU Charter rights by the CJEU.	Article 52(3) CFR; Evolving ECtHR Jurisprudence 12

4.2 The Principle of Bona Fide Interpretation and Treaty Body Integration

The evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the CJEU demonstrates a robust and growing reliance on the findings of United Nations Treaty Bodies (UNTBs), including the Committee Against Torture.31 The Venice Commission, a preeminent advisory body of the Council of Europe, has emphatically stressed that state parties cannot simply ignore UNTB findings; they are under a strict international legal obligation to consider them in good faith (bona fide).30 The legal consequence is that Member States must take these final views into profound consideration, and failing to react to a finding by a UN Treaty Body would appear to amount to a direct violation of international obligations.30

If the UN Committee Against Torture rules unequivocally that the Dutch state engaged in systemic psychological torture, the weaponization of psychiatry to silence a citizen 4, or deliberately orchestrated a multi-decade cover-up involving state actors, this international legal finding severely restricts the European Commission’s political maneuverability and legal deniability. The EU Guidelines on Human Rights explicitly state that the European Union’s policy against torture forms a core, non-negotiable element of both its internal and external action, and that all Member States must fully cooperate with the UN Committee Against Torture.32

Furthermore, the EU human rights framework explicitly requires the integration of UNCAT General Comments and the execution of relevant international judgments.33 A continued, obstinate refusal by the European Commission to investigate a Member State following a damning, definitive UNCAT verdict confirming systemic torture and state complicity could easily be challenged as an ‘abuse of right’ and a fundamental dereliction of its constitutional duty as the Guardian of the Treaties.34 It would create an untenable paradox wherein the EU espouses the absolute prohibition of torture globally while tolerating established, UN-verified perpetrators within its own borders.

5. Re-Framing the Narrative: Systemic Infringement and the Article 2 TEU Threshold

Because the European Commission’s mandate under Article 258 TFEU is fundamentally not designed to adjudicate individual grievances or issue personal financial redress 1, a 50-year individual ordeal, no matter how harrowing, must be theoretically and legally reframed to trigger supranational EU intervention. The individual tragedy must be empirically proven to be symptomatic of a much broader, catastrophic institutional collapse within the Member State.

5.1 The Concept of State Capture and the Systemic Breakdown of the Rule of Law

To successfully force the European Union to act, the evidentiary record—ideally bolstered by the independent findings of UNCAT—must demonstrate a condition of “State Capture” or a systemic, persistent breach of the foundational values enumerated in Article 2 of the TEU. Article 2 explicitly states that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.7

State capture is legally and politically characterized by the systemic subversion of independent state institutions—such as the judiciary, the police forces, intelligence agencies, and health regulatory bodies—to serve the corrupt interests of a specific elite group or state apparatus, resulting in an environment of total impunity and a fundamental breakdown of the separation of powers.35 The applicant’s paradigm case—which alleges that police were formally forbidden by the Ministry of Justice from taking criminal reports, that psychiatric diagnoses were actively weaponized as tools of institutional gaslighting, and that highly classified intelligence files detailing the abuses were systematically erased 4—perfectly aligns with advanced theoretical models of state capture and systemic institutional corruption.35

If these severe allegations are validated by an international body like UNCAT, it proves beyond doubt that the national judicial and administrative remedies of the Netherlands are fundamentally compromised and entirely illusory for the victim. When a domestic judiciary is captured, complicit, or willfully blind to state-sponsored torture, it ceases to function as an independent court capable of upholding EU law or protecting EU citizens. This triggers a massive structural threat to the EU legal order itself, justifying, and indeed requiring, supranational intervention to preserve the integrity of the European project.7

5.2 The Evolution of the Systemic Infringement Action

Historically, the European Commission has relied on highly narrow, technical infringement procedures, targeting specific legislative misalignments or failures to transpose directives, rather than addressing broad democratic backsliding.7 However, prominent legal scholars and recent, albeit limited, institutional practices suggest the absolute necessity of a “systemic infringement action” when dealing with rogue states.7

This proposed mechanism involves the Commission deliberately bundling a multitude of specific, individual violations into a single, comprehensive overarching action to demonstrate a pattern of persistent, coordinated government conduct that fundamentally undermines Article 2 TEU values.7 What makes the breach of EU law worthy of a systemic infringement procedure is not just the sheer number of individual violations, but their overall pattern, persistence, and systematicity.7

If the applicant can successfully package the 50-year timeline of alleged abuses—unlawful detention, forced medical intervention, denial of fundamental asylum rights, transnational intimidation, and the weaponization of the judiciary 4—as a cohesive, documented pattern demonstrating the total structural failure of the Dutch legal system to uphold human dignity, the Commission possesses the theoretical framework required to bypass the “internal matter” defense. The legal argument fundamentally shifts from an individual plea of “the EU must compensate me for a domestic crime” to a systemic imperative of “the EU must sanction a Member State whose justice system has systematically failed to uphold Article 2 TEU and is actively protecting perpetrators of torture.”

6. Procedural Avenues and Mechanisms of Compulsion: Forcing the EU Commission to Act

Establishing the theoretical basis for EU intervention (transnational elements, UNCAT findings, and systemic state capture) is only the foundational half of the battle. The applicant must overcome exceedingly steep procedural hurdles to legally compel the politically cautious and highly discretionary European Commission to actually deploy its enforcement tools.

6.1 Article 7 TEU: The Political Nuclear Option

Article 7 TEU establishes a formal mechanism to sanction a Member State in the event of a “clear risk of a serious breach” or an actual “serious and persistent breach” of the values referred to in Article 2.8 While highly relevant to verified cases of state capture and systemic torture, Article 7 is fundamentally a political mechanism, not a judicial one.

Its ultimate sanctioning arm—which can lead to the suspension of a Member State’s voting rights in the Council—requires absolute unanimity in the European Council (excluding the accused state).7 This stringent requirement has rendered the procedure highly susceptible to political paralysis and “fellow-traveller vetoes,” where autocratic or complicit states protect one another from sanction.7 Consequently, an individual citizen cannot legally force the activation or ensure the successful conclusion of an Article 7 procedure through the courts; it remains a tool entirely dependent on the political will of the Member States.8

6.2 The Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation

A more potent, modern, and legally accessible mechanism is the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation (Regulation 2020/2092), which allows the European Union to suspend or withhold funds to Member States where breaches of the rule of law directly affect the sound financial management of the EU budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union.8

To force action via this specific route, the applicant (or an advocating institution) must establish a “direct link” between the alleged systemic human rights violations (i.e., the state capture protecting the perpetrators of the 50-year ordeal) and a tangible risk to EU financial interests.8 While this is challenging to prove for an individual tort case, if the systemic corruption involves the misuse of EU justice or security funds to silence dissidents, or if the lack of judicial independence compromises the proper administration and protection of EU law and revenues, the conditionality mechanism becomes highly viable.45 If a UNCAT finding proves that the Dutch justice system is corrupt and captured, the EU cannot guarantee that its funds are being managed legally within that jurisdiction.

6.3 Article 265 TFEU: The Action for Failure to Act

If the Commission is presented with incontrovertible evidence of systemic human rights violations (such as a definitive UNCAT finding) but still obstinately refuses to initiate infringement proceedings, the ultimate question arises: can the Commission be sued for its inaction?

Article 265 TFEU provides that if an EU institution “fails to act in breach of the Treaties,” Member States, other EU institutions, and natural or legal persons may bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to have the infringement established.48 However, the procedural barriers for private individuals (non-privileged applicants) attempting to utilize this mechanism are notoriously stringent and frequently insurmountable.51

6.3.1 The Locus Standi Hurdle and the Plaumann Doctrine

To be deemed admissible, an individual bringing an Article 265 TFEU claim must demonstrate that the institution failed to adopt an act (other than a non-binding recommendation or opinion) that would have been explicitly addressed to them, or an act that is of “direct and individual concern” to them.51 This requirement is heavily guided by the restrictive Plaumann doctrine.51

1. Direct Concern: The failure to act must directly affect the applicant’s legal situation without requiring any further implementation by national authorities.54
2. Individual Concern: The failure to act must differentiate the applicant from all other persons and distinguish them individually just as in the case of the person addressed.53

6.3.2 The Unreviewable Discretion of Infringement Proceedings

The most insurmountable obstacle for an individual attempting to force the EU to act is the settled, rigid jurisprudence of the CJEU regarding Article 258 TFEU (infringement proceedings). The Court has consistently held that the European Commission enjoys unreviewable, absolute discretionary power in deciding whether to commence an infringement procedure.1

Because the Commission is not legally obligated under the Treaties to issue a formal notice or reasoned opinion against a Member State, its refusal to do so cannot, by definition, constitute an “unlawful failure to act” within the meaning of Article 265 TFEU.48 Consequently, the General Court and the CJEU routinely and rapidly declare Article 265 actions brought by individuals seeking to force the Commission to launch infringement proceedings against a Member State as manifestly inadmissible.55

 

Enforcement Mechanism	Function and Scope	Viability for Forcing EU Action by an Individual
Article 258 TFEU (Infringement)	The Commission sues a Member State for breaching EU law or Treaty obligations.13	Extremely Low: The Commission holds absolute discretion; the initiation of proceedings cannot be forced by individual citizens through the courts.1
Article 7 TEU (Political Sanction)	A political sanctioning mechanism for a systemic breach of Article 2 values, potentially suspending voting rights.8	Extremely Low: Requires supermajority or unanimity in the Council; it is a purely political process that cannot be judicially compelled by an individual.8
Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation	Suspends EU funds to Member States for Rule of Law breaches threatening the budget.8	Moderate (Indirect): Requires proving a direct link to EU financial interests. While powerful, it must be initiated by the Commission, not individuals.8
Article 265 TFEU (Failure to Act)	A lawsuit brought against the Commission or other EU body for unlawful inaction in breach of the Treaties.49	Extremely Low: Individuals lack locus standi (standing) under the Plaumann doctrine to force the initiation of discretionary infringement proceedings.50

6.4 The Role of Inter-Institutional Pressure and Parliamentary Proxies

Given the judicial dead ends of Article 265 TFEU for private individuals, forcing the Commission to act relies almost entirely on inter-institutional dynamics and the strategic use of proxies. While a private citizen cannot successfully sue the Commission for failing to launch an infringement procedure, the European Parliament holds the status of a “privileged applicant” under Article 265 TFEU, meaning it does not have to prove individual concern to bring an action.49

The European Parliament has increasingly utilized the threat of an Article 265 TFEU lawsuit to pressure the Commission into action regarding Rule of Law violations, specifically concerning the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation.57 If an applicant can successfully mobilize key parliamentary committees (such as the LIBE Committee on Civil Liberties or the PETI Committee on Petitions) using the irrefutable, independent evidence of a UNCAT finding of systemic torture and state capture, the Parliament can formally adopt a resolution calling upon the Commission to act.60 If the Commission subsequently fails to define its position or act to protect the EU’s fundamental values within two months, the Parliament possesses the legal standing to bring a highly publicized failure-to-act lawsuit against the Commission before the CJEU.49

7. Strategic Prerequisites for Forcing European Union Intervention: A Synthesis

Based on the comprehensive synthesis of EU jurisdictional limits, international human rights law, and institutional enforcement mechanisms, the mere procedural fact that two separate UNCAT complaints have been filed is legally insufficient to immediately bypass the EU’s “internal problem” blockage. The legal architecture of the European Union is specifically designed to resist piecemeal individual tort claims and maintain a strict separation of competences.

To definitively override the internal matter defense and force the European Union apparatus into aggressive action concerning a multi-decade ordeal spanning multiple jurisdictions 4, an applicant must systematically fulfill four strategic legal prerequisites:

1. Secure a Definitive UNCAT Finding of Violation: The mere submission of a communication under Article 22 of UNCAT initiates dialogue but lacks immediate binding force.28 The applicant must achieve a formal View or Finding from the Committee Against Torture explicitly stating that the Member States (the Netherlands and Spain) have violated their obligations under the Convention (e.g., failure to investigate, complicity in ill-treatment, violation of non-refoulement, failure to provide redress).27 Once a UN Treaty Body issues a definitive finding of a jus cogens violation, the Member States are under an international legal obligation to act in good faith, and the EU’s “mutual trust” presumption regarding those states’ judicial independence is severely undermined, providing the necessary evidentiary foundation for further EU action.30
2. Establish the Transnational EU Law Nexus: The European Commission will permanently block any complaint rooted solely in domestic criminal law by invoking Article 51 CFR.2 The applicant must definitively pivot the legal narrative away from domestic offenses and explicitly anchor it in EU cross-border competences. By demonstrating that the alleged abuses involved cross-border movement (e.g., transnational repression spanning the Netherlands and Spain, manipulation of EU asylum or judicial cooperation instruments, or abuses by foreign agents in exile 4), the matter is elevated from a domestic dispute to a violation of the EU Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, destroying the purely internal rule.
3. Demonstrate Systemic State Capture Under Article 2 TEU: The Commission explicitly avoids providing individual redress for isolated instances of wrongful application of law.1 The 50-year timeline of alleged abuses must be legally documented not as a series of isolated, unfortunate crimes, but as undeniable evidence of “State Capture”.7 The applicant must prove that the domestic judiciary, intelligence services, and medical establishments have been systematically subverted by the state to protect perpetrators, rendering domestic legal exhaustion impossible and creating a structural threat to the Rule of Law (Article 2 TEU).7 This provides the theoretical justification for the Commission to launch a “Systemic Infringement Action”.7
4. Mobilize Privileged Institutional Actors (The European Parliament): Because an individual citizen cannot successfully wield Article 265 TFEU (Failure to Act) to force the Commission to initiate an infringement procedure due to strict locus standi rules 50, the applicant must convert the UNCAT findings and evidence of state capture into potent political leverage. This requires petitioning the European Parliament.61 The Parliament, unlike an individual, has the legal standing and the institutional weight to formally demand action from the Commission. If the Commission ignores the UN-verified evidence of systemic torture and state capture within a Member State, the Parliament can successfully sue the Commission under Article 265 TFEU for failing to uphold its duties as Guardian of the Treaties.49

8. Analytical Conclusions

The European Commission’s persistent characterization of severe, domestic human rights abuses as an “internal problem” is deeply rooted in the structural, constitutional limitations of the European Union’s competence, specifically the principle of conferral and Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In isolation, the domestic crimes alleged by an individual—regardless of their profound severity or their 50-year duration—remain legally inaccessible to direct EU infringement intervention if they do not explicitly involve the implementation of Union law.

The deliberate introduction of twin, transnational communications before the United Nations Committee Against Torture represents a critical, paradigm-shifting pivot in this legal stalemate. While the act of filing these complaints does not immediately dismantle the EU’s jurisdictional blockade, the resulting trajectory possesses the capacity to force a systemic institutional reappraisal. If the UNCAT proceedings yield a definitive, internationally recognized finding of state-sponsored torture, impunity, and cross-border complicity involving two European Member States, the “purely internal” defense evaporates under the weight of customary international law and the EU’s own commitments to human rights.

However, to legally compel the European Union to abandon its passivity, the applicant cannot rely on the futile pursuit of an individual Article 265 TFEU lawsuit against the Commission. Instead, the strategy must rely on synthesizing a definitive UNCAT ruling with the doctrines of transnational repression and systemic state capture. By weaponizing an international treaty body finding to unequivocally prove that a Member State’s judiciary is fundamentally compromised and incapable of protecting EU values, the applicant provides the European Parliament with the exact evidentiary ammunition required to force the European Commission’s hand. It is only through this complex, multi-layered institutional pressure that a localized half-century ordeal can be successfully transformed into an actionable supranational constitutional crisis, forcing the EU to act in defense of its foundational treaties.

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