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Legal Assessment and Strategic Guidance for a Complaint to the European Ombudsman Regarding the European Commission’s Refusal in the Hans Smedema Affair

I. Executive Summary

This report provides a comprehensive legal assessment of the viability of challenging the European Commission’s third refusal to engage with Mr. Hans Smedema’s systemic allegations. The proposed avenue for this challenge is a complaint to the European Ombudsman. The Commission’s consistent stance, asserting a lack of competence and characterizing the matter as an “internal problem” of a Member State, is subjected to critical scrutiny against the extensive allegations of systemic state capture, profound human rights violations, and cross-border implications within the Netherlands.

The analysis concludes that the European Commission’s repeated and dismissive refusal to address Mr. Smedema’s complaint appears to constitute maladministration. This determination is based on the Commission’s apparent failure to recognize and act upon the profound implications of Mr. Smedema’s claims for core European Union law and values, including the Rule of Law, fundamental rights, the principle of sincere cooperation, and mutual trust among Member States. The prior refusals by the Dutch National Ombudsman, coupled with the reported validation of a “cover-up” by the Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD), collectively underscore a critical lack of effective domestic remedies. This situation significantly amplifies the imperative for engagement at the EU level.

The core strategic recommendation for Mr. Smedema is to meticulously frame the complaint to the European Ombudsman. This framing must present the Commission’s inaction not as a mere procedural oversight, but as a fundamental failure to uphold its Treaty obligations. The complaint should strategically leverage the detailed legal assessments of systemic breaches, emphasizing their cumulative impact and the direct threat they pose to the integrity of the EU legal order. The objective is to compel a re-evaluation by the Commission, potentially leading to the activation of relevant EU enforcement mechanisms designed to address such grave and systemic violations.

II. Introduction: The Hans Smedema Affair and the European Commission’s Stance

Recap of the Hans Smedema Affair

Mr. Hans Smedema, a Dutch citizen, has been embroiled in a decades-long struggle against the Dutch State, alleging profound and multi-faceted human rights violations and systemic injustice since 1972. He describes his experience as a “bizarre judicial error of unprecedented scale” and even a “Dutch Watergate”.1 His allegations include claims of forced drugging, sexual abuse, and rape of his wife, as well as his own illegal infertility, all leading to a “horrific cover-up” or “cordon sanitaire” orchestrated by various state entities. These entities purportedly include the Ministry of Justice, intelligence services (AIVD, MIVD), police, judiciary, medical professionals, and even the Royal House.1 Mr. Smedema’s account details a systemic denial of legal aid, with hundreds of lawyers allegedly refusing his case, police reports being rejected, and judicial investigations prohibited.1 These claims collectively point to a pervasive pattern of systemic maladministration and a profound breakdown of the rule of law within the Netherlands.1

The European Commission’s Refusal

The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, specifically Unit C.4, has repeatedly declined to engage with Mr. Smedema’s complaint. A letter dated July 16, 2025 (Ref. JUST.C.4.001/KDS/ms (2025)7825610s), explicitly states that the Commission had “already replied to your questions concerning corruption in the Netherlands, and have clearly stated that the Commission is not competent to act in this specific instance”.1 This communication represents the third such refusal, reinforcing an earlier position from June 25, 2025, where the Commission stated the matter was “not related to the implementation of European Union law”.1 It further asserted that Member States are “solely responsible for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security,” and thus, the Commission was “not empowered to intervene”.1 The July 16, 2025 letter concludes with a definitive statement: “We therefore regret to inform you that the Commission does not intend to reply to any future correspondence from you on these subjects”.1

The User’s Objective

Given this repeated and dismissive refusal by the European Commission, Mr. Smedema seeks expert legal guidance on how to challenge this decision. His primary objective is to lodge a complaint with the European Ombudsman, asking for an investigation into the European Commission’s handling of his case. This action aims to compel the Commission to re-engage with the substantive allegations and their implications for EU law.

The Commission’s letter, explicitly stating its reservation of “the right to discontinue correspondence which is repetitive” and its intention not to “reply to any future correspondence” 1, represents more than a mere refusal; it signifies a pre-emptive closure of communication channels. This dismissive stance, particularly in light of the gravity and alleged systemic nature of Mr. Smedema’s claims 1, could be interpreted as a failure of good administration. Such an approach suggests a lack of thorough engagement and an unwillingness to reassess a complex situation, potentially violating fundamental principles of diligence, transparency, and responsiveness expected of an EU institution. This administrative conduct effectively creates a procedural barrier, preventing the complainant from even attempting to present new arguments or additional context, thereby denying due process at the administrative level. This pre-emptive closure of communication could itself be a form of maladministration, as it potentially hinders the Commission from fulfilling its foundational duty as guardian of the Treaties, as enshrined in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

The Commission’s assertion of being “not competent to act in this specific instance” and that the matter is “not related to the implementation of European Union law” 1 is directly challenged by the very nature of Mr. Smedema’s allegations. His claims, particularly those concerning “State Capture” and the alleged provision of “knowingly false information to an EU Member state Spain” 1, extend far beyond a purely domestic concern. If the allegations of “State Capture” are substantiated, then the Dutch state’s capacity to uphold

any law—including EU law and international human rights obligations—is fundamentally compromised.1 This transforms the issue from a purely “internal” matter into one that directly impacts the foundational values and operational integrity of the entire European Union, such as the Rule of Law (Article 2 TEU) and sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU).1 The Commission’s narrow interpretation of its competence, therefore, risks inadvertently allowing a Member State to shield systemic breaches behind a facade of domestic jurisdiction, thereby undermining the very purpose of the EU’s foundational values.

III. The Mandate and Limitations of the European Ombudsman

Role and Scope

The European Ombudsman operates as an independent and impartial body, specifically established to investigate cases of maladministration by European Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies.2 This mandate encompasses key EU institutions such as the European Commission, which is the direct subject of Mr. Smedema’s intended complaint. The Ombudsman is empowered to initiate inquiries either on its own initiative or in response to complaints submitted by EU citizens, or any natural or legal person residing or having their registered office in a Member State.2

Definition of Maladministration

Maladministration, within the context of the European Ombudsman’s mandate, is broadly defined. It occurs when an EU institution fails to uphold fundamental rights, disregards legal rules or principles, or deviates from the established principles of good administration.2 This comprehensive definition covers a wide array of administrative shortcomings, including, but not limited to, a lack of transparency in decision-making, unfairness in procedures, abuse of power, a failure to provide timely responses, or unreasonable delays in handling matters.2

Admissibility Criteria for Complaints

For a complaint to be deemed admissible by the European Ombudsman, several key criteria must be satisfied:

Identity of Complainant: The individual or entity lodging the complaint must be an EU citizen, or a natural or legal person residing or having their registered office within an EU Member State.2
Recipient of Complaint: The complaint must specifically concern alleged maladministration by an EU institution, body, office, or agency.2 It is crucial to note that the European Ombudsman generally lacks the direct authority to investigate the actions of national, regional, or local public administrations within individual Member States.4
Prior Approach: The complainant is typically required to have first contacted the EU institution concerned and attempted to resolve the matter through its internal complaints procedure. This ensures that the institution has had an initial opportunity to address the issue before the Ombudsman intervenes.4
Time Limit: A complaint must be submitted within two years of the date on which the person affected became aware of the facts giving rise to the alleged maladministration.4
No Parallel Court Action: The Ombudsman will not investigate a case if the complainant has already initiated court action concerning the same matter.5

Powers and Outcomes

While the European Ombudsman’s decisions and recommendations are not legally binding, they carry substantial moral and political weight. The Ombudsman’s primary approach involves seeking a mutually satisfactory solution in cooperation with the institution concerned. Should a finding of maladministration be made, formal recommendations are issued to the institution, which then has a three-month period to inform the Ombudsman of its views. If these recommendations are not accepted, the Ombudsman possesses the authority to draw up a special report, which is then addressed to the European Parliament. The European Parliament, in turn, may consider and draw up its own report on the special report from the Ombudsman.2 This process leverages political and reputational pressure to encourage compliance and foster better administrative practices within EU institutions.

The European Ombudsman’s mandate explicitly excludes direct investigation of Member State administrations.4 Mr. Smedema’s core complaint is fundamentally about the alleged actions of the Dutch State.1 This necessitates a strategic framing of the complaint to the European Ombudsman. The focus must be squarely on how the

European Commission’s handling of Mr. Smedema’s allegations—specifically its dismissive refusal based on a narrow interpretation of its competence—constitutes maladministration. The underlying systemic issues in the Netherlands serve as the context that the Commission allegedly failed to properly assess, rather than being the direct subject of the Ombudsman’s investigation. This distinction is critical for the complaint’s admissibility and its potential for success. The Commission’s failure to recognize the profound EU-level implications of “State Capture” and cross-border deception, as detailed in Mr. Smedema’s assessments 1, is the alleged maladministration that the European Ombudsman is empowered to investigate.

The Ombudsman’s requirement for prior contact with the institution 4 is a procedural step that Mr. Smedema has clearly fulfilled, as the current complaint targets the European Commission’s

third refusal to engage.1 This prior engagement, while initially a hurdle, now provides a strong foundation for the complaint. The fact that the Commission’s response was not merely a single refusal but a

repeated, dismissive stance 1 despite the gravity and systemic nature of the allegations, significantly strengthens the argument that its administrative conduct falls short of good administration principles. This pattern of non-engagement is precisely the type of administrative failure that the European Ombudsman is designed to address, transforming a procedural prerequisite into a compelling element of the complaint.

Table 1: European Ombudsman Mandate and Admissibility Criteria

Feature	Description
Primary Mandate	Investigate maladministration by EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies. Promote good administration.
Scope of Authority	All EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies. Excludes the Court of Justice of the EU acting in its judicial capacity.3 Does	not directly investigate national, regional, or local public administrations in Member States.4
Definition of Maladministration	Failure by an EU institution to respect fundamental rights, legal rules or principles, or the principles of good administration.2
Key Admissibility Criteria
Complainant	EU citizen, or natural/legal person residing/registered in a Member State.2
Subject	Concerns maladministration by an EU institution, body, office, or agency.2
Prior Contact	Complainant must have first contacted the institution concerned and attempted internal resolution.4
Time Limit	Complaint made within two years of awareness of the facts.4
No Court Action	Ombudsman will not investigate if court action has already commenced on the same matter.5
Powers/Outcomes	Recommendations are not legally binding but carry significant moral/political weight. Seeks satisfactory solution. Can issue special reports to the European Parliament if recommendations are not accepted.2

IV. Analysis of the European Commission’s Refusal as Potential Maladministration

Argument for Maladministration

The European Commission’s repeated and dismissive refusal to engage with Mr. Smedema’s profound and systemic allegations, as explicitly detailed in the letter from Unit C.4 1, can be compellingly argued to constitute maladministration. Maladministration, as defined within the European Ombudsman’s mandate, encompasses an institution’s failure to respect fundamental rights, legal rules or principles, or the overarching principles of good administration.2 The Commission’s conduct, in this instance, appears to fall significantly short in several of these critical areas.

The Commission’s statement that it “does not intend to reply to any future correspondence” 1 represents a pre-emptive closure of communication, rather than a mere procedural refusal. This rigid adherence to discontinuing “repetitive” correspondence, without adequately addressing the evolving context or the systemic and grave nature of Mr. Smedema’s claims, can be viewed as a profound failure of good administrative practice. Good administration demands responsiveness, diligence, and thoroughness, particularly in cases alleging serious human rights violations and systemic governmental misconduct.

Furthermore, the European Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, bears the fundamental responsibility to ensure the application of EU law, as stipulated in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Its refusal to intervene, predicated on a narrow interpretation of “competence” and the assertion of an “internal problem” 1, suggests a failure to adequately assess whether the alleged systemic issues within the Netherlands indeed implicate and undermine core EU law and values. This administrative approach, therefore, risks a dereliction of its foundational duty.

Critique of the Commission’s “Internal Problem” Argument

The European Commission’s assertion that Member States are “solely responsible for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security,” and that Mr. Smedema’s matter is “not related to the implementation of European Union law” 1, is fundamentally challenged by the very nature and scope of Mr. Smedema’s allegations.

The Concept of “State Capture” and its Incompatibility with EU Law

Mr. Smedema’s claims align directly with the definition of “State Capture,” a form of systemic political corruption where private interests infiltrate state structures to influence decision-making processes and ensure impunity for their actions.1 This phenomenon is explicitly recognized as “completely incompatible with EU membership” and fundamentally undermines the Rule of Law, a foundational value enshrined in Article 2 TEU.1 If a Member State’s Ministry of Justice is alleged to be “captured” by influential figures like Joris Demmink, its inherent capacity to uphold

any law—including EU law and international human rights obligations—is fundamentally compromised.1 The Commission’s dismissal, therefore, overlooks a direct and existential threat to the foundational values and operational integrity of the entire European Union.

The Commission’s consistent use of the “internal problem” argument 1, despite the detailed allegations of cross-border actions and systemic threats to EU values 1, suggests more than a mere legal interpretation. This indicates a potential political reluctance to intervene in highly sensitive Member State affairs, particularly those involving allegations of high-level corruption and state capture. The Commission, operating as a political body, may be prioritizing diplomatic relations or seeking to avoid the inherent complexities and significant political hurdles associated with activating robust enforcement mechanisms, such as the Article 7 TEU procedure.1 In this context, the alleged maladministration is not solely a legal misjudgment but a strategic choice to avoid political entanglement, which inadvertently undermines the Commission’s vital role as guardian of the Treaties. The European Ombudsman, by virtue of its independence, is uniquely positioned to challenge this political inertia by focusing on the administrative duty of the Commission to act diligently and impartially.

Cross-Border Implications and Breach of Sincere Cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU)

A critical and highly problematic aspect of Mr. Smedema’s complaint is the allegation that the Netherlands has “knowingly provided false information to other EU Member States, specifically Spain, and to non-EU countries such as the USA, Canada, and Mexico”.1 This alleged conduct directly implicates the fundamental EU principle of sincere cooperation, enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. This principle mandates that the Union and its Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks flowing from the Treaties and, crucially, “abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.1

The provision of knowingly false information to a fellow Member State, particularly within a legal or investigative context, constitutes a clear and direct failure to cooperate sincerely. Such an action could directly jeopardize the attainment of key EU objectives, especially those related to the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) and the vital principle of mutual trust among Member States, upon which cross-border judicial cooperation relies.1 This is unequivocally

not an internal matter, as it directly undermines the very fabric of inter-state relations within the Union.

Denial of Fundamental Rights (Article 19 TEU, Article 47 CFR, Article 6 ECHR) as an Integral Part of “State Capture”

Mr. Smedema’s allegations include the systematic denial of legal representation since 1972/2000, the rejection of police reports, and the prohibition of judicial investigations, all of which he attributes to pervasive state interference.1 These alleged actions directly violate fundamental human rights, specifically the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 19 TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).1

Jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights confirms that the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule applies only to remedies that are “accessible” and “effective,” and that a “less rigid approach” is adopted when there is “deliberate concealment and obstruction on the part of some authorities”.1 If these systematic denials of legal recourse are, as alleged, integral to the “State Capture” mechanism designed to ensure impunity, then the European Commission’s inaction in the face of such grave and systemic human rights violations constitutes a fundamental failure to uphold foundational EU values. The Commission’s failure to recognize this “abuse of process” by the Member State, where procedural rights are allegedly misused to obstruct justice 1, further compounds its administrative shortcomings.

Implications for Protection of EU Financial Interests (Article 325 TFEU)

Mr. Smedema’s argument extends to the financial implications of the alleged state capture, contending that a Ministry of Justice plagued by systemic corruption is inherently “incapable of effectively combating fraud against the EU budget (PIF Directive, Article 325 TFEU)”.1 This contention directly links the alleged systemic corruption within a Member State’s core institutions to the protection of the Union’s financial interests, a matter of clear and explicit EU competence. This nexus is also a key criterion for the activation of mechanisms such as the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation.1 The Commission’s administrative failure to investigate or even acknowledge this potential connection further indicates maladministration, as it overlooks a direct threat to the integrity of the EU’s financial framework.

The cumulative and interconnected nature of Mr. Smedema’s claims—encompassing breaches of the Rule of Law, fundamental rights, sincere cooperation, mutual trust, and potential impacts on financial interests 1—presents a compelling picture of systemic failure. While any single alleged breach might, in isolation, be dismissed as an “internal” or isolated incident, the Commission’s failure to recognize this cumulative effect, and to treat the allegations as an integrated systemic problem rather than discrete, unrelated incidents, constitutes a profound administrative oversight. The argument for the European Ombudsman is that the sheer volume, consistency, and multi-agency nature of these allegations should have reached a “tipping point” where the EU can no longer credibly maintain that the issue is purely internal. The Commission’s continued dismissal, therefore, represents a failure to adapt its administrative approach to the gravity and systemic nature of the alleged violations, thereby potentially enabling the perpetuation of alleged abuses.

Table 2: Analysis of European Commission’s Refusal and Counter-Arguments

Commission’s Stated Reason	Counter-Argument (Based on Mr. Smedema’s Allegations & EU Law)	Relevant Data Points
“Not competent to act in this specific instance.” 1	The Commission’s narrow interpretation of competence overlooks the systemic nature of “State Capture” and its direct impact on EU foundational values. If a Member State’s core institutions are compromised, its capacity to uphold any law, including EU law, is fundamentally undermined. 1	Allegations of “State Capture” within the Ministry of Justice by figures like Joris Demmink. 1 State capture is “completely incompatible with EU membership” and undermines the Rule of Law (Article 2 TEU). 1
“Matter is not related to the implementation of European Union law.” 1	The allegations directly implicate core EU values and principles, such as the Rule of Law, fundamental rights, and sincere cooperation, which are integral to the implementation of EU law. 1	Alleged breaches of Rule of Law (Article 2 TEU), denial of fundamental rights (Article 19 TEU, Article 47 CFR, Article 6 ECHR), and breach of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU). 1
“Member States are solely responsible for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security.” 1	The alleged cross-border provision of “knowingly false information” to other EU Member States (e.g., Spain) and non-EU countries (USA, Canada, Mexico) transcends internal security and directly undermines mutual trust and sincere cooperation within the EU. 1	Allegation that the Netherlands “knowingly provided false information to an EU Member state Spain” and other countries. 1 This directly implicates Article 4(3) TEU. 1
“Commission does not intend to reply to any future correspondence from you on these subjects.” 1	This pre-emptive closure of communication, despite the gravity and systemic nature of the allegations, constitutes a failure of good administration, demonstrating a lack of diligence, transparency, and responsiveness. 1	Commission letter dated July 16, 2025, stating intent to discontinue repetitive correspondence. 1
“Not empowered to intervene.” 1	The cumulative effect of alleged systemic breaches (Rule of Law, fundamental rights, sincere cooperation, financial interests) should trigger EU enforcement mechanisms, such as infringement procedures or the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. 1	Alleged systemic corruption within the Ministry of Justice impacts its ability to combat fraud against the EU budget (Article 325 TFEU), potentially triggering the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. 1

V. Legal Text for a Complaint to the European Ombudsman

A complaint to the European Ombudsman must be meticulously drafted to focus on the European Commission’s alleged maladministration, rather than directly on the actions of the Dutch State. The core argument is that the Commission’s repeated refusal to engage with Mr. Smedema’s complaint, based on a narrow and arguably incorrect interpretation of its competence, constitutes a failure to uphold its Treaty obligations and principles of good administration.

Here is a proposed structure and key legal arguments for a complaint to the European Ombudsman:

To: The European Ombudsman

From: Mr. Hans Smedema

Date:

Subject: Complaint of Maladministration by the European Commission (Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, Unit C.4) regarding its refusal to address systemic Rule of Law and human rights violations in the Netherlands (Ref. JUST.C.4.001/KDS/ms (2025)7825610s)

Introduction and Purpose of Complaint

This complaint is lodged against the European Commission (specifically Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, Unit C.4) for its repeated and dismissive refusal to engage with grave and systemic allegations of state capture, profound human rights violations, and cross-border deception within the Netherlands. The Commission’s stance, articulated in its letter of July 16, 2025 (Ref. JUST.C.4.001/KDS/ms (2025)7825610s) 1, asserting a lack of competence and characterizing the matter as an “internal problem” 1, constitutes maladministration. This maladministration stems from the Commission’s failure to recognize and act upon the profound implications of these allegations for core European Union law and values.

Background of the Hans Smedema Affair (Concise Summary)

Since 1972, I, Hans Smedema, a Dutch citizen, have been subjected to and have documented systemic human rights violations and a pervasive “cover-up” orchestrated by various Dutch state entities, including the Ministry of Justice, intelligence services, police, and judiciary.1 These allegations include forced drugging, sexual abuse, and illegal infertility, alongside a systemic denial of legal aid, rejection of police reports, and prohibition of judicial investigations.1 These claims collectively point to systemic maladministration and a profound breakdown of the rule of law within the Netherlands.1

III. The European Commission’s Refusal and Alleged Maladministration

The European Commission, through Unit C.4, has repeatedly refused to engage with my complaint, stating that it is “not competent to act in this specific instance” and that the matter is “not related to the implementation of European Union law”.1 The Commission’s letter of July 16, 2025, explicitly states its intention “not to reply to any future correspondence from you on these subjects”.1

This repeated and dismissive refusal constitutes maladministration for the following reasons:

Failure to Uphold Principles of Good Administration: The Commission’s pre-emptive closure of communication, without thorough engagement or reassessment of the grave and systemic nature of the claims, demonstrates a lack of diligence, transparency, and responsiveness expected of an EU institution. This denies due process at the administrative level.1
Failure to Act as Guardian of the Treaties (Article 17 TEU): The Commission’s narrow interpretation of its competence, dismissing the matter as purely “internal,” overlooks its fundamental responsibility to ensure the application of EU law and values. My allegations directly implicate foundational EU values, which the Commission is duty-bound to protect.1

Why the Commission’s “Internal Problem” Argument is Flawed and Implicates EU Law

The Commission’s assertion that my complaint is a purely “internal problem” of a Member State is fundamentally challenged by the nature and scope of the allegations, which directly impact core EU law and values:

Systemic State Capture (Article 2 TEU – Rule of Law): My allegations describe “State Capture,” a form of systemic political corruption where private interests infiltrate state structures to influence decision-making and ensure impunity.1 This phenomenon is “completely incompatible with EU membership” and fundamentally undermines the Rule of Law, a foundational value enshrined in Article 2 TEU.1 If the Dutch Ministry of Justice is “captured,” its capacity to uphold
any law, including EU law and international human rights obligations, is compromised.1 The Commission’s dismissal, therefore, overlooks a direct threat to the EU’s foundational values and operational integrity.
Breach of Sincere Cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) and Erosion of Mutual Trust: I allege that the Netherlands has “knowingly provided false information to an EU Member state Spain” and to non-EU countries.1 This directly implicates Article 4(3) TEU, which mandates sincere cooperation and abstention from measures jeopardizing Union objectives.1 The provision of false information to a fellow Member State unequivocally undermines mutual trust, a structural principle vital for the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ).1 This is not an internal matter but a direct assault on the fabric of inter-state relations within the Union.
Denial of Fundamental Rights as an Instrument of State Capture (Article 19 TEU, Article 47 CFR, Article 6 ECHR): My complaint details the systematic denial of legal representation, rejection of police reports, and prohibition of judicial investigations since 1972/2000.1 These actions violate the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial (Article 19 TEU, Article 47 CFR, Article 6 ECHR).1 The alleged provision of false information to international courts, leading to rejections based on a fabricated “lack of domestic exhaustion,” constitutes an “abuse of process” by the state.1 These denials are not isolated incidents but integral components of the alleged “State Capture” mechanism, designed to ensure impunity by dismantling legal accountability.1
Implications for Protection of EU Financial Interests (Article 325 TFEU): A Ministry of Justice compromised by systemic corruption is inherently “incapable of effectively combating fraud against the EU budget (PIF Directive, Article 325 TFEU)”.1 This directly links the alleged systemic corruption to the protection of the Union’s financial interests, a matter of clear EU competence and a criterion for the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation.1

Lack of Effective Domestic Remedies

The repeated refusals by the Dutch National Ombudsman to investigate my complaint, despite my efforts to exhaust domestic avenues, underscore the critical lack of effective domestic remedies.1 The Ombudsman’s initial refusal in 2005 predated any court judgment on the merits of my claims, and the subsequent 2009 refusal followed a defamation case against me, not a case initiated by me seeking justice for the alleged abuses.1

Crucially, the Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD), an independent oversight body with unique access to sensitive information, reportedly “verbally confirmed the cover-up and conspiracy” and advised me that an Ombudsman investigation was a “possibility”.1 This external validation from a specialized body, which uses the National Ombudsman’s own “guidelines on proper conduct,” directly contradicts the Ombudsman’s refusal and highlights a systemic flaw in Dutch oversight.1

Conclusion and Request to the European Ombudsman

The European Commission’s repeated and dismissive refusal to engage with my complaint, based on an overly narrow interpretation of its competence, constitutes maladministration. The systemic nature of the alleged “State Capture,” the cross-border provision of false information, and the deliberate denial of fundamental rights are not mere “internal problems” but profound breaches of foundational EU values and principles. The lack of effective domestic remedies further amplifies the imperative for EU-level engagement.

I respectfully request that the European Ombudsman:

Initiate an inquiry into the alleged maladministration by the European Commission (Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, Unit C.4) concerning its handling of my complaint.
Assess whether the Commission’s refusal to engage, particularly its assertion of a lack of competence, aligns with its duties as guardian of the Treaties and the principles of good administration, especially in light of the systemic and cross-border implications of the allegations.
Recommend that the European Commission re-evaluate its stance and engage substantively with my complaint, potentially leading to the activation of relevant EU enforcement mechanisms to address the alleged systemic breaches of the Rule of Law, fundamental rights, and sincere cooperation within the Netherlands.

I am available to provide any further information or documentation required for this inquiry.

Sincerely,

Hans Smedema

Works cited

Assessment of the Dutch National Ombudsmans Refusal to Investigate the Hans Smedema Affair.pdf
The European Ombudsman | Fact Sheets on the European Union, accessed July 17, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/18/the-european-ombudsman
European Ombudsman – Practical Law, accessed July 17, 2025, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Glossary/UKPracticalLaw/I3f4a4376e8db11e398db8b09b4f043e0
Make a complaint – European Ombudsman, accessed July 17, 2025, https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/how-can-the-ombudsman-help
Complaining to an ombudsman – Citizens Advice, accessed July 17, 2025, https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/consumer/get-more-help/how-to-use-an-ombudsman-in-england/