Last Updated 27/04/2025 published 27/04/2025 by Hans Smedema

Systemic Corruption within a National Ministry of Justice: An Analysis of Potential Violations of European Union Law

Requested by victim Hans Smedema specifically on the Dutch Ministry of Justice and former secretary-General Joris Demmink as explained in this Post:

Dutch EU Membership Rules and Laws Consistently Violated by Joris Demmink with other Ministries Corruptly Included since 1972!

The following is without(!) mentioning those details:

1. Introduction

This report addresses the profound legal implications under European Union (EU) law arising from a scenario involving sustained, systemic corruption and obstruction of justice within a Member State’s Ministry of Justice (MoJ). The MoJ occupies a critical position within any national legal system, typically bearing significant responsibility for the administration of justice, the proper functioning of courts and prosecution services, and upholding the rule of law. Systemic corruption within such an institution, spanning decades, therefore represents not merely a domestic governance failure but a fundamental challenge to the very foundations of the EU legal order.

The European Union is explicitly founded on values including the rule of law, democracy, and respect for human rights, values common to all Member States.1 Adherence to these values is not merely an entry requirement but an ongoing obligation for Member States, underpinning the entire structure of EU law, the internal market, and the area of freedom, security, and justice (AFSJ).2 Every action taken by the EU itself is founded on Treaties approved voluntarily and democratically by all Member States, creating binding obligations upon them.4 Consequently, a Member State institution, particularly one as central as the MoJ, acting in persistent contravention of these foundational principles through corruption and obstruction of justice, strikes at the heart of the EU’s legal and value system. Such actions risk undermining the effective application of EU law, eroding the mutual trust between Member States essential for cooperation, and violating the fundamental rights of individuals.2

The purpose of this report is to conduct an in-depth legal analysis identifying the specific EU laws, principles, and fundamental rights potentially violated by sustained, systemic corruption and obstruction of justice within a Member State’s MoJ. The analysis will proceed by examining:

• The violation of the foundational principle of the rule of law enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
• The breach of obligations related to judicial independence and the fundamental rights to an effective remedy and a fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).
• Potential violations of specific EU anti-corruption legal frameworks.
• The potential triggering of the EU’s Rule of Law framework and associated enforcement mechanisms.
• Violations related to the protection of the Union’s financial interests.
• The erosion of the principle of mutual trust necessary for judicial cooperation within the AFSJ. Finally, the report will synthesize these findings, providing a consolidated overview of the potential EU law violations.

2. Section 1: Violation of the Foundational Principle of the Rule of Law (Article 2 TEU)

2.1. The Rule of Law as a Core EU Value under Article 2 TEU

Article 2 TEU unequivocally states that “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights…”.1 This provision places the rule of law not as a mere policy objective, but as a foundational element of the Union’s identity and legal order.1 It is a value considered common to all Member States, forming part of Europe’s cultural, religious, and humanist inheritance.1

While Member States possess diverse national identities, legal traditions, and constitutional structures, which the EU respects 1, the core meaning of the rule of law is understood consistently across the Union.3 It requires that all public powers operate within the constraints set by law, adhering to democratic values and fundamental rights, and subject to the control of independent and impartial courts.2 Key components distilled from EU law and jurisprudence include:

• Legality: Laws must be enacted through a transparent, accountable, democratic, and pluralistic process.3
• Legal Certainty: Rules must be clear, predictable, and foreseeable, enabling individuals and businesses to understand their rights and obligations.3
• Prohibition of Arbitrary Exercise of Executive Power: Public officials cannot act arbitrarily or abuse power for personal gain and must be held accountable.3
• Effective Judicial Protection by Independent and Impartial Courts: Access to justice before courts free from undue influence is essential.2
• Separation of Powers: Ensuring checks and balances between different branches of government.3
• Equality Before the Law: The law applies equally to everyone, without discrimination.3

Respect for the rule of law is not an abstract ideal; it is functionally indispensable for the EU. It guarantees the uniform and effective application of EU law across all Member States, ensures the proper functioning of the internal market, fosters an investment-friendly environment, and crucially, underpins the mutual trust necessary for cooperation, particularly in the AFSJ.2 Adherence to the rule of law is also a prerequisite for EU membership (Copenhagen criteria) 2 and, as subsequent analysis will show, a continuing condition for the full enjoyment of rights derived from the Treaties.9

2.2. How Systemic Corruption and Obstruction of Justice Fundamentally Undermine the Rule of Law

Systemic corruption and obstruction of justice originating from within a national Ministry of Justice represent a direct and comprehensive assault on the principle of the rule of law as understood in the EU context. Such actions fundamentally contradict the core components identified above:

• Violation of Legality and Prohibition of Arbitrariness: Corruption, defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain 14, inherently involves public powers acting outside the constraints of the law and often arbitrarily.3 When the MoJ itself is systemically corrupt, the executive branch responsible for ensuring justice operates unlawfully and arbitrarily, undermining the very essence of legality. Decisions regarding investigations, prosecutions, appointments, or resource allocation may be driven by illicit considerations rather than legal merits.
• Attack on Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A corrupt MoJ can directly interfere with the judiciary through various means (detailed in Section 3.3), such as manipulating appointments, exerting pressure, or misusing disciplinary procedures. This compromises the independence and impartiality of courts, which are indispensable elements of the rule of law.2 Without independent courts, the entire system of checks and balances collapses.
• Negation of Effective Judicial Review/Protection: Obstruction of justice, a key element of the scenario, directly prevents the judicial system from fulfilling its role. If investigations are blocked, evidence tampered with, or court decisions ignored, the capacity for effective judicial review of executive actions and the protection of citizens’ rights is nullified.8 Access to justice becomes illusory if the process is controlled or subverted by corrupt actors within the MoJ.
• Destruction of Equality Before the Law: Corruption inherently breeds inequality. It creates a system where access to justice, favourable decisions, or impunity depends not on legal rights but on bribery, connections, or influence.3 This shatters the principle that all are equal before the law, disproportionately harming vulnerable groups and eroding public trust.15

Beyond these core components, systemic corruption within the MoJ erodes the credibility of state institutions, undermines their capacity to deliver public services effectively, distorts fair competition, and can create space for organized crime to flourish.16 It represents a failure of the state to perform its essential functions of maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security, functions acknowledged albeit primarily as national responsibilities under Article 4(2) TEU.1 Such a profound breakdown within the justice ministry signifies a systemic failure to uphold the rule of law.

2.3. The Enforceability and Systemic Implications of Breaching Article 2 TEU Values

The legal status and direct enforceability of Article 2 TEU itself have been subject to debate. While it enshrines the Union’s fundamental values, its potential use as a standalone legal basis for infringement actions before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) remains contested.13 Some academic commentary and initial interpretations suggested Article 2 TEU might evolve into an independent standard of review.18 However, the European Commission’s own Legal Service has clarified its position, indicating that Article 2 TEU typically needs to be invoked in conjunction with other, more specific provisions of EU law and within the material scope of EU law as defined by the Treaties.13 This aligns with the principle of conferral under Article 5(2) TEU, which states the Union acts only within the limits of competences conferred upon it by Member States.1 Article 2 TEU, in this view, primarily serves an interpretative and systemic function, guiding the application of other EU law provisions rather than independently extending the Union’s competence or creating new obligations outside conferred areas.13

Despite the debate on direct justiciability, the significance of Article 2 TEU should not be underestimated. The CJEU’s case law, notably in contexts like the Repubblika judgment, suggests that Member States are under a continuous obligation to respect the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU throughout their membership, not merely as an accession condition.13 This implies a duty of non-regression, meaning Member States cannot amend their legislation or allow practices that result in a reduction in the protection afforded to these values, including the rule of law.9 A Member State is required to prevent any regression in its laws on the organization of justice that would undermine judicial independence.9

Therefore, even if Article 2 TEU is not always the primary legal basis for an infringement action, a systemic and persistent breach of the rule of law, as exemplified by decades of corruption and obstruction within a MoJ, provides the crucial context for violations of more specific EU law provisions, such as Article 19 TEU and Article 47 CFR (discussed below). The systemic nature of the breach is key.18 Such a situation signals a fundamental departure from the shared values upon which the Union is founded and can activate broader EU responses designed to address systemic threats, including the Rule of Law framework mechanisms or, in extremis, the Article 7 TEU procedure.2

The very structure of the EU, based on conferred powers 1 and respect for national identities 1, creates an inherent tension when confronted with systemic breaches of fundamental values within a Member State. Systemic corruption within a core institution like the MoJ pushes this tension to its limit, forcing the EU to navigate the complex relationship between upholding shared values and respecting national sovereignty. This is not merely a technical legal question but reflects a deep constitutional challenge for the Union.

Furthermore, a persistent and systemic failure by a Member State to uphold the rule of law, particularly within its justice system, transcends ordinary non-compliance with EU rules. It calls into question the Member State’s fundamental commitment to the shared values that form the basis of its EU membership.2 Since adherence to these values is an ongoing obligation 9, a systemic failure demonstrated by decades of MoJ corruption signifies a potential breach of this fundamental membership commitment. This inevitably erodes the mutual trust between that Member State and its partners, a trust that is indispensable for the functioning of the Union, especially in areas requiring close judicial cooperation.2 Such a situation justifies significant EU scrutiny and potential intervention aimed at addressing the systemic failure itself.

3. Section 2: Breach of Judicial Independence and Fundamental Rights to Effective Remedy and Fair Trial (Article 19 TEU & Article 47 CFR)

Systemic corruption within a Ministry of Justice directly implicates core EU legal provisions designed to safeguard the integrity of national judicial systems and protect individual rights to access justice. Specifically, Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 CFR are central to this analysis.

3.1. Article 19(1) TEU: The Obligation to Ensure Effective Judicial Protection and Independence

The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU mandates that “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”.5 This provision, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, codifies and reinforces the principle of effective judicial protection, recognized previously as a general principle of EU law.20 It gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law enshrined in Article 2 TEU 9 and assigns national courts and tribunals a crucial role alongside the CJEU in ensuring judicial review within the EU legal order.10

The CJEU has interpreted this provision robustly. It requires Member States to ensure that any national body which qualifies as a ‘court or tribunal’ and is likely to rule on the application or interpretation of EU law meets the requirements of effective judicial protection.9 Crucially, the Court has held that the independence of such courts and tribunals is an essential component of this effective judicial protection.9

A key aspect of the CJEU’s interpretation is the scope of application. The obligation under Article 19(1) TEU applies to national courts operating “in the fields covered by Union law”.21 The Court has clarified that this wording is broader than the condition for the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights under Article 51(1) CFR, which applies “when are implementing Union law”.21 Consequently, the mere fact that a national court may be called upon to interpret and apply EU law is sufficient to trigger the obligation under Article 19(1) TEU to ensure its independence.9 This gives Article 19(1) TEU significant reach in setting standards for national judicial systems.

Judicial independence, as defined by the CJEU drawing on established principles and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, entails several requirements. Courts must exercise their functions in full autonomy, free from hierarchical constraints, subordination to other bodies, or external orders or instructions.10 They must be protected from external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardize their independence.10 This requires legal safeguards concerning the composition of judicial bodies, the appointment process, the length of service (tenure), grounds for dismissal (irremovability), and protection against arbitrary removal.10 It also encompasses internal independence, meaning impartiality or neutrality with respect to the parties and the interests before the court.11 Even the perception of a lack of independence can be sufficient to breach this requirement, as rules must be such as to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals about the court’s imperviousness.21

3.2. Article 47 CFR: The Right to an Effective Remedy and Fair Trial by an Independent Tribunal

Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly guarantees the “Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial”.22 Its first paragraph states that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. The second paragraph guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. It also includes the right to be advised, defended, and represented. The third paragraph concerns the provision of legal aid where necessary to ensure effective access to justice.22

Article 47 CFR is based on Articles 6(1) (fair trial) and 13 (effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and its meaning and scope must be at least equivalent to those ECHR provisions.22 However, EU law protection may be more extensive; for instance, the right to an effective remedy under Article 47(1) specifically guarantees access to a court.26 The CJEU considers Article 47 CFR a reaffirmation of the general principle of effective judicial protection, which stems from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and is a cornerstone of the EU as a community based on the rule of law.22 Like other Charter rights, Article 47 applies to Member States only when they are implementing Union law (within the meaning of Article 51(1) CFR).26 Crucially for the present analysis, Article 47 explicitly enshrines the requirement that the tribunal guaranteeing the fair trial must be independent and impartial.12

3.3. Mechanisms of Interference: How a Corrupt MoJ Impedes Judicial Independence and Access to Justice

Systemic corruption and obstruction of justice emanating from a Ministry of Justice can manifest in numerous ways that directly undermine the judicial independence required by Article 19(1) TEU and the right to an independent tribunal under Article 47 CFR. These mechanisms include:

• Manipulation of Judicial Appointments and Promotions: A corrupt MoJ might influence appointment or promotion procedures to favour politically compliant or corruptible individuals, while blocking or sidelining independent candidates. This directly impacts the composition of the judiciary and raises doubts about its independence from the executive.34
• Misuse of Disciplinary Proceedings: Disciplinary mechanisms intended to ensure judicial accountability can be weaponized by a corrupt MoJ to intimidate, pressure, or remove judges who resist political influence or investigate sensitive corruption cases.19
• Politically Motivated Resource Allocation: The MoJ often controls judicial budgets. It could strategically underfund courts known for their independence or starve specific judges or prosecution units handling corruption cases of necessary resources, thereby hindering their effectiveness.34
• Interference with Case Assignment: A corrupt MoJ might seek to influence the allocation of specific cases (e.g., high-profile corruption trials) to particular judges perceived as favourable, undermining the principle of the lawful judge and impartiality.35 National laws preventing review of such irregular assignments have been found contrary to EU law.35
• Undermining Salaries and Working Conditions: While general, non-discriminatory salary reductions linked to objective needs like budgetary austerity may be permissible 10, targeted measures or the creation of generally precarious working conditions could potentially be used to exert pressure or undermine the status and independence of judges.
• Direct Obstruction of Justice: This can involve direct or indirect pressure on judges, prosecutors, or court staff; interference in ongoing investigations, particularly those targeting corruption involving political allies; preventing the execution of judgments; or fostering a climate of impunity.

These actions, particularly when systemic and sustained over decades, fundamentally compromise the guarantees of judicial independence. They create objective conditions that would lead reasonable observers to doubt the judiciary’s autonomy, impartiality, and imperviousness to external factors, thereby violating the standards set by both Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 CFR.11

3.4. Analysis through CJEU Case Law Precedents

The CJEU has developed significant case law clarifying the requirements of judicial independence under EU law, primarily through interpreting Article 19(1) TEU, often read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 CFR. Key precedents include:

• Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16): This landmark judgment established the direct link between Article 19(1) TEU, the rule of law value in Article 2 TEU, and the requirement for Member States to ensure the independence of national courts liable to rule on EU law matters, as essential for guaranteeing effective judicial protection.9
• Commission v Poland Cases: A series of infringement proceedings and preliminary rulings concerning Polish judicial reforms have seen the CJEU condemn various measures. These include lowering the retirement age of Supreme Court judges without objective justification and giving the executive discretion over extensions 23, establishing new disciplinary regimes for judges lacking sufficient guarantees against political influence 23, and creating new judicial chambers whose independence was questionable due to the appointment process.24 The Court consistently held that such measures violated the obligation under Article 19(1) TEU to ensure judicial independence and irremovability.21
• Cases on Appointment and Case Assignment: The CJEU has affirmed that judicial independence requires a lawful appointment process and that doubts about a judge’s legitimate appointment can undermine public confidence.35 It has also ruled that national laws preventing courts from reviewing potentially irregular case assignments violate Article 19(1) TEU.35

While many of these cases involved legislative changes impacting the judiciary, the principles established are directly applicable, arguably with even greater force (a fortiori), to situations where systemic corruption and obstruction of justice originating from the executive branch (the MoJ) achieve the same or similar results in undermining judicial independence, access to justice, and fair trial rights. The methods may differ (administrative malpractice, illicit influence vs. legislation), but the outcome – a compromised judiciary unable to fulfil its functions independently – constitutes a clear violation of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 CFR.

The broad interpretation given by the CJEU to the phrase “fields covered by Union law” in Article 19(1) TEU proves particularly significant here.20 It means that the EU standard of judicial independence applies as a baseline requirement to all national courts that might potentially adjudicate on matters involving EU law, regardless of whether they are dealing with such a matter in a specific instance.9 This transforms Article 19(1) TEU into a powerful instrument for addressing systemic deficiencies that pervade a national judicial system due to the corrupting influence of the MoJ. Even if a particular corrupt act within the MoJ does not immediately touch upon an EU law case, if its effect is to systemically undermine the independence of the judiciary as a whole (e.g., through control over appointments or disciplinary processes), it constitutes a breach of Article 19(1) TEU. This provides a robust legal foundation for EU intervention against the systemic capture or degradation of a national judiciary.

Furthermore, the existence of guarantees for judicial independence under both Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 CFR provides complementary legal avenues for challenging the effects of MoJ corruption. Article 19(1) TEU imposes an objective, structural obligation on Member States to ensure their judicial systems are independent.10 Systemic corruption within the MoJ leading to a failure to meet this standard constitutes a breach of this structural obligation, potentially actionable through infringement proceedings. Article 47 CFR, conversely, grants individuals a subjective fundamental right to a fair trial before an independent tribunal.26 When corruption within the MoJ affects a specific case – for example, leading to a biased judge or obstructed proceedings – the individual concerned can invoke Article 47 CFR to challenge the fairness of their trial and seek an effective remedy. Thus, pervasive MoJ corruption triggers violations actionable at both the systemic level (under Article 19 TEU) and the individual case level (under Article 47 CFR), reinforcing the legal basis for condemning and addressing such practices.

4. Section 3: Violation of EU Anti-Corruption Frameworks

Beyond the fundamental principles of the rule of law and judicial independence, systemic corruption within a Ministry of Justice would likely involve conduct that contravenes specific EU anti-corruption legislative frameworks, both existing and proposed.

4.1. Overview of Applicable EU Anti-Corruption Legislation

The EU has adopted several instruments over the years aimed at combating corruption, although their scope and effectiveness have limitations. Key instruments include:

• Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA: This focuses specifically on combating corruption in the private sector.16
• Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union (1997): This convention addresses bribery involving EU or national officials.16
• The PIF Directive (Directive (EU) 2017/1371): Discussed further in Section 5, this directive harmonizes definitions and penalties for offences, including corruption, that affect the EU’s financial interests.16

The European Commission has acknowledged that these existing instruments have not fully achieved their objectives and that gaps remain in national enforcement, alongside obstacles to cross-border cooperation.16 Challenges faced by national authorities include lengthy judicial proceedings, short statutes of limitation, rules on immunity, lack of resources and training, and limited investigative powers.16

Reflecting these shortcomings and the transnational nature of corruption, the Commission has proposed a new, more comprehensive EU Directive on Corruption.16 This proposal aims to ensure that all key forms of corruption are criminalized throughout the EU, that legal persons can be held liable, and that penalties are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive in a harmonized manner.16 It notably seeks to make certain offences, which are only optional or broadly defined under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (such as trading in influence, abuse of functions, and illicit enrichment), mandatory under EU law.16 The UNCAC itself serves as an important international benchmark often referenced in EU anti-corruption policy.16

The ongoing legislative effort towards a stronger, harmonized EU anti-corruption directive underscores a recognition at the EU level that existing frameworks are insufficient to tackle complex and systemic corruption, particularly when it involves the abuse of public functions and the obstruction of justice within state institutions like a Ministry of Justice. The scenario described in this report—decades of corruption and obstruction within the MoJ—epitomizes the very type of deep-seated, institutional corruption that necessitates more robust and harmonized legal tools at the EU level. The existence of such a proposal validates the gravity of the problem and signals an EU-level ambition to better equip itself and Member States to combat it.

4.2. Analysis of Specific Corruption Offences within the Ministry’s Context

Systemic corruption within a MoJ over decades would almost certainly involve multiple instances of conduct classifiable as criminal offences under existing or proposed EU anti-corruption standards. Drawing on the categories mentioned in the context of the proposed directive 16, potential offences include:

• Bribery (Active and Passive): MoJ officials, prosecutors, or staff involved in the justice administration accepting bribes (passive bribery) to influence decisions (e.g., drop charges, assign a case favourably, secure a lenient sentence, facilitate a corrupt appointment). Equally, individuals or groups offering bribes (active bribery) to MoJ officials for such illicit purposes.
• Trading in Influence: MoJ officials using their real or supposed influence over other public officials or decision-making processes (within the MoJ, judiciary, or elsewhere) in exchange for an undue advantage.
• Abuse of Functions: Officials within the MoJ intentionally performing an act, or failing to perform an act they are required to do, in violation of laws or regulations, with the aim of obtaining an undue advantage for themselves or a third party. This could encompass a wide range of actions, such as improperly interfering in prosecutorial decisions, manipulating recruitment or disciplinary procedures for corrupt ends, or deliberately mismanaging resources.
• Misappropriation: MoJ officials diverting public funds, assets, or resources entrusted to them for personal gain or other unauthorized purposes. This could involve embezzlement from the MoJ budget or misuse of state property.
• Obstruction of Justice: This offence is particularly relevant given the query’s focus. It involves actions aimed at interfering with the proper course of justice, such as using threats or bribes to influence witnesses or experts, destroying evidence, or exerting improper pressure on judges or law enforcement officials to prevent the investigation, prosecution, or adjudication of corruption cases (or other offences).16 A corrupt MoJ might systematically engage in such acts to protect itself and its allies.
• Illicit Enrichment: While potentially more challenging to prosecute and defined as non-mandatory under UNCAC 16, this involves a significant increase in the assets of a public official that cannot be reasonably explained by their legitimate income. Decades of systemic corruption could lead to such unexplained wealth among implicated MoJ officials.

The explicit inclusion of “obstruction of justice” as a distinct criminal offence in the proposed EU directive 16 is highly significant in this context. It elevates actions designed to undermine the integrity of the justice process itself—the core characteristic of a corrupt MoJ scenario—from being merely ancillary to other corrupt acts to being a primary target of anti-corruption law. This provides a specific legal basis for prosecuting those within the MoJ who actively sabotage investigations, pressure judges, or otherwise impede the course of justice, thereby reinforcing the protection of judicial independence (Section 2) and the rule of law (Section 1). The systemic nature of the corruption described implies not isolated incidents but a pattern of such offences, potentially involving officials at various levels, including high-level positions, contributing to public perception that such cases are not effectively pursued.34

5. Section 4: Triggering EU Rule of Law Enforcement Mechanisms

A situation involving decades of systemic corruption and obstruction of justice within a Member State’s Ministry of Justice would inevitably attract the attention of the EU’s monitoring and enforcement mechanisms designed to address threats to the rule of law. The EU possesses a “toolbox” of instruments with varying degrees of intensity.3

5.1. The EU Rule of Law Framework: Monitoring and Dialogue (Annual Report)

The centrepiece of the EU’s preventive approach is the European Rule of Law Mechanism, established in 2014 and featuring the annual Rule of Law Report since 2020.2 This mechanism aims to foster an annual dialogue between EU institutions, Member States, national parliaments, and other stakeholders.37 The report assesses developments across four key pillars: national justice systems (focusing on independence, quality, and efficiency), anti-corruption frameworks, media pluralism and freedom, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances.34 Its stated goals include promoting a rule of law culture, preventing problems from escalating, and enabling early intervention.2 Since 2022, the reports include country-specific recommendations.8

However, the effectiveness of the annual report as an enforcement tool, particularly in cases of severe or systemic backsliding, has been questioned. Criticisms include the use of overly diplomatic language, a failure to adequately confront the most problematic Member States like Hungary and pre-2023 Poland, and the drawing of potentially misleading parallels between qualitatively different situations.38 For instance, praising the adoption of an anti-corruption strategy might be positive in one context but largely meaningless in a state where corruption is systemic and flows from the top.38 Furthermore, the lack of direct consequences for failing to implement recommendations and instances of perceived politicization (e.g., delays in publication) may undermine the report’s impact in preventing deterioration.38 While valuable for monitoring, the annual report alone is unlikely to resolve decades of entrenched MoJ corruption.

5.2. Potential for Infringement Procedures (Article 258 TFEU)

The European Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, has the power to launch infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU against a Member State for failing to fulfil its Treaty obligations. This tool has been utilized in the context of rule of law concerns, most notably against Poland regarding measures affecting judicial independence, often based on breaches of Article 19(1) TEU.17 If the CJEU finds a Member State in breach, the state is required to take necessary measures to comply.

Systemic corruption and obstruction of justice within the MoJ, leading to demonstrable breaches of Article 19(1) TEU (undermining judicial independence) and potentially other EU law obligations (e.g., under the PIF Directive), could form the basis for infringement actions. However, observers have noted a general decline in the number of infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission since the early 2000s, potentially reflecting a strategy of “forbearance” or preference for dialogue over confrontation to maintain political cooperation on other policy files.36 While important exceptions exist where the Commission has pursued rule of law infringements 38, the potential for political considerations to influence the use of this tool remains a factor.

5.3. Applicability of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation

A significant development in the EU’s rule of law toolbox is Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092, establishing a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget.38 This regulation allows for the suspension, reduction, or restriction of access to EU funding for Member States where breaches of the principles of the rule of law affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget or the protection of the Union’s financial interests.

The principles of the rule of law relevant under the regulation explicitly include the proper functioning of authorities implementing the EU budget, the effective investigation and prosecution of fraud (including corruption) affecting the budget, and effective judicial review by independent courts. Systemic corruption within the MoJ directly impacts these areas. It can cripple the state’s ability to investigate and prosecute EU fraud (see Section 5) and fundamentally undermines the independence of the judiciary required for effective review (see Section 2). This provides a strong nexus between the rule of law breach (MoJ corruption) and the protection of EU financial interests. The regulation has already been invoked, leading to the freezing of significant EU funds for Hungary due to deficiencies related to corruption, public procurement, and judicial independence.38 Given its potential financial leverage, the conditionality regulation represents a potentially powerful tool to address systemic MoJ corruption that impacts the justice system’s ability to safeguard EU funds.

5.4. The Article 7 TEU Procedure as a Measure of Last Resort

Article 7 TEU provides a mechanism specifically designed to address serious breaches of the values mentioned in Article 2 TEU. It involves two stages: Article 7(1) allows the Council, acting by a four-fifths majority after obtaining Parliament’s consent, to determine a clear risk of a serious breach, following a reasoned proposal from one-third of Member States, the Parliament, or the Commission.1 Article 7(2) allows the European Council, acting by unanimity (excluding the state concerned) after obtaining Parliament’s consent, to determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach of Article 2 values.7 Only after a determination under Article 7(2) can the Council, acting by qualified majority, decide to suspend certain rights of the Member State, including voting rights (Article 7(3)).

Article 7(1) procedures have been initiated against Poland (by the Commission in 2017) and Hungary (by the Parliament in 2018).5 However, progressing to Article 7(2) and imposing sanctions under Article 7(3) faces significant political hurdles, primarily the requirement for unanimity in the European Council for the determination of a breach. This has led to Article 7 being described as the ‘nuclear option’, difficult to deploy effectively in practice.5 While decades of systemic MoJ corruption could arguably constitute a “serious and persistent breach” of the rule of law, triggering Article 7 remains politically challenging.

The existence of this range of tools, from dialogue to financial pressure and political sanctions, reflects an escalating scale of potential EU intervention. However, the choice and effectiveness of these instruments are heavily influenced by the specific context, the nature and severity of the breach, and prevailing political dynamics. Given the description of decades of systemic corruption and obstruction within a core state institution like the MoJ, it is highly probable that measures going beyond mere dialogue (the annual report) would be considered necessary. Infringement procedures targeting specific breaches (e.g., of Art 19 TEU) and, notably, the conditionality regulation, leveraging financial consequences linked to the justice system’s failure to protect the EU budget, appear as the more plausible and potentially effective avenues for exerting pressure for reform, short of the politically fraught Article 7 process.

The Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, in particular, marks a significant strategic evolution. By linking rule of law compliance directly to access to EU funds, it attempts to create tangible financial incentives for adherence to fundamental values.38 Its successful application hinges on demonstrating a sufficiently direct link between the identified rule of law breaches – such as systemic MoJ corruption impairing investigations or judicial independence – and the sound financial management of the EU budget or the protection of its financial interests. This mechanism effectively translates concerns about abstract values into concrete financial consequences, potentially offering greater leverage than purely legal or political démarches.

6. Section 5: Violation of Laws Protecting the EU’s Financial Interests

Systemic corruption within a Member State’s Ministry of Justice poses a direct threat to the financial interests of the European Union, potentially violating specific EU legal obligations designed to protect the Union budget.

6.1. The PIF Directive and the Obligation to Protect the EU Budget

Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (the PIF Directive) is a key instrument in this area. It builds upon earlier efforts like the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests and its protocols.16 The Directive aims to strengthen the protection of the EU budget by establishing minimum rules for the definition of criminal offences and sanctions concerning fraud, corruption, money laundering, and misappropriation that harm the Union’s financial interests.16

Crucially, the PIF Directive, alongside the general obligation enshrined in Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), requires Member States to take effective, proportionate, and dissuasive measures to counter fraud and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests. This obligation explicitly includes ensuring effective investigation and prosecution of such offences.16 Member States must ensure that conduct constituting fraud or corruption detrimental to the EU budget is punishable by effective criminal penalties.39

6.2. Linkages Between Justice System Corruption and Financial Fraud against the EU

A Ministry of Justice plagued by systemic corruption and obstruction of justice is inherently incapable of fulfilling the Member State’s obligation to effectively protect the EU’s financial interests. The linkages are direct and damaging:

• Obstruction of Investigations and Prosecutions: A corrupt MoJ can actively block, delay, or improperly influence investigations and prosecutions related to the misuse of EU funds, particularly if those involved are politically connected or part of the corrupt networks. This directly contravenes the requirement for effective investigation and prosecution under the PIF Directive.
• Compromised Judiciary: If the MoJ’s corruption extends to influencing judicial appointments or exerting pressure on judges (as discussed in Section 2), this can lead to unduly lenient treatment, flawed trials, or unwarranted acquittals for individuals accused of defrauding the EU budget. This undermines the requirement for effective and dissuasive sanctions.
• Failure to Ensure Institutional Capacity: A corrupt MoJ may fail to provide adequate resources, autonomy, or support to the specific bodies responsible for investigating and prosecuting PIF offences (e.g., specialized prosecution units, anti-fraud agencies, relevant police departments). This lack of capacity prevents effective action against EU fraud.
• Fostering Impunity: When the justice system itself is compromised by corruption originating from the MoJ, it creates an environment of impunity. Potential fraudsters may perceive a low risk of detection and punishment, encouraging further illegal activities detrimental to the EU budget. The public perception that high-level corruption cases are not sufficiently pursued reflects this reality.34

Therefore, the failure of a Member State to maintain a justice system capable of effectively combating offences against the EU’s financial interests, precisely because the ministry responsible for its administration is systemically corrupt, constitutes a clear violation of its obligations under the PIF Directive and Article 325 TFEU. This failure is not merely about isolated shortcomings but about a systemic incapacity rooted in corruption at the heart of the justice administration.

This direct link between the integrity of the national justice system (compromised by MoJ corruption) and the protection of the EU’s financial interests provides a powerful justification for employing financial instruments like the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation (Section 4.3). It elevates the issue beyond a violation of abstract values (Article 2 TEU) or procedural rights (Article 19 TEU, Article 47 CFR) to one with tangible financial consequences for the Union as a whole. The inability of a corrupt MoJ to guarantee the effective application of the PIF Directive serves as critical evidence demonstrating how rule of law deficiencies directly threaten the sound financial management of the EU budget, thereby meeting the threshold for triggering conditionality measures.

7. Section 6: Erosion of Mutual Trust in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)

Systemic corruption within a Member State’s Ministry of Justice has severe repercussions that extend beyond its national borders, significantly undermining the principle of mutual trust which is fundamental to cooperation within the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).

7.1. The Principle of Mutual Trust as a Cornerstone of EU Judicial Cooperation

The entire framework of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters within the EU is built upon the principle of mutual trust.2 This principle entails that Member States generally trust the quality and integrity of each other’s legal systems, assuming that they comply with EU law and, in particular, respect fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter and the ECHR.5 This mutual confidence allows for the smooth functioning of various cooperation instruments based on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions.

Prominent examples of mechanisms heavily reliant on mutual trust include:

• The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system, which requires judicial authorities in one Member State to execute arrest warrants issued by authorities in another Member State, with limited grounds for refusal.30
• Regulations concerning the mutual recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
• Instruments facilitating cross-border evidence gathering, such as the European Investigation Order (EIO).

This trust, however, is not absolute. The CJEU has recognized that it can be rebutted in exceptional circumstances, particularly where there are systemic or generalized deficiencies in the issuing Member State’s judicial system that demonstrate a real risk of breach of fundamental rights, notably the right to a fair trial under Article 47 CFR.19

7.2. How National Rule of Law Deficiencies Undermine Trust and Cooperation

Systemic, decades-long corruption and obstruction of justice within a Member State’s Ministry of Justice fundamentally erode the presumption of compliance with the rule of law and fundamental rights upon which mutual trust is based.2 If the institution responsible for administering justice is itself corrupt and actively undermines judicial independence and fair trial guarantees, other Member States can no longer reasonably trust that judicial decisions and requests emanating from that state meet requisite EU standards.

The tangible consequences of this erosion of trust are severe for the functioning of the AFSJ:

• Refusal to Execute Cooperation Requests: Judicial authorities in other Member States may increasingly scrutinize and potentially refuse to execute EAWs or other cooperation requests (e.g., EIOs, requests for judgment recognition) originating from the Member State with the compromised justice system. They may do so based on concerns that executing the request would lead to a violation of the requested person’s fundamental rights, particularly the right to a fair trial before an independent tribunal (Article 47 CFR).
• Challenges to Validity: Legal challenges may be mounted against the validity or enforceability of judgments rendered by courts perceived to lack independence due to the influence of the corrupt MoJ.
• Increased Friction and Delay: Even if requests are not outright refused, the need for heightened scrutiny due to lack of trust will inevitably lead to delays, increased procedural complexity, and friction in cross-border judicial cooperation.
• Systemic Paralysis: In extreme cases, pervasive lack of trust could lead to a near-paralysis of judicial cooperation with the affected Member State, effectively isolating its justice system and severely hampering the EU’s collective ability to fight cross-border crime and ensure justice within the AFSJ.

Thus, systemic corruption within one Member State’s MoJ does not remain an isolated internal problem. Through the mechanism of mutual trust, it directly impacts the operational effectiveness and integrity of the entire EU-wide system of judicial cooperation.18 The failure of one Member State to uphold rule of law standards transmits negative consequences across the Union, potentially leading to the fragmentation of the AFSJ.

This demonstrates how deeply interconnected the EU legal order is. Addressing systemic MoJ corruption becomes necessary not only to rectify the situation within the affected Member State and protect the rights of its citizens but also to preserve the functionality and integrity of essential EU cooperation mechanisms for all Member States. The breakdown of mutual trust provides a compelling justification for EU intervention, using the available tools (Section 4), as the problem transcends national borders and affects the collective interest of the Union in maintaining a functional AFSJ.

8. Section 7: Synthesis of Potential EU Law Violations

The preceding analysis demonstrates that sustained, systemic corruption and obstruction of justice within a Member State’s Ministry of Justice constitute a multi-faceted and profound violation of European Union law. Such a scenario represents not merely isolated instances of non-compliance but a fundamental assault on the core values, principles, and legal obligations that underpin the EU legal order.

8.1. Consolidated Summary of Breached EU Laws, Principles, and Rights

In essence, the systemic corruption described constitutes a grave breach of the foundational value of the rule of law enshrined in Article 2 TEU, undermining legality, legal certainty, the prohibition of arbitrary power, equality before the law, and, critically, the requirement for independent courts. It directly violates the Member State’s obligation under Article 19(1) TEU to provide effective judicial protection by ensuring the independence of its judiciary, particularly courts liable to rule on EU law matters. Concurrently, it infringes the fundamental right to an effective remedy and a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, as guaranteed by Article 47 CFR, for individuals whose cases are affected by the compromised justice system.

Furthermore, specific actions undertaken by corrupt officials within the MoJ likely constitute criminal offences under EU anti-corruption frameworks (existing or proposed), particularly offences such as abuse of function and obstruction of justice. The failure of the compromised justice system to effectively combat fraud against the EU budget violates the Member State’s obligations under the PIF Directive (Directive (EU) 2017/1371) and Article 325 TFEU. Finally, the systemic deficiencies resulting from MoJ corruption inevitably erode the principle of mutual trust, paralyzing judicial cooperation mechanisms essential for the functioning of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).

8.2. Table: Summary of Potential EU Law Violations Stemming from Systemic MoJ Corruption

The following table provides a structured overview linking the manifestations of systemic MoJ corruption to specific EU law violations and their core impact:

Violated EU Law / Principle	Manifestation in Corrupt MoJ Scenario	Core Impact / Consequence
Article 2 TEU – Rule of Law	Arbitrary exercise of executive power within MoJ; disregard for legal constraints; systemic inequality; failure to ensure independent judicial control.	Breach of foundational EU values; erosion of democratic principles; questioning of membership commitments.
Article 19(1) TEU – Effective Judicial Protection	Systemic undermining of judicial independence (via appointments, discipline, resources, pressure); failure to ensure courts meet EU standards.	Compromised national judicial system; inability of courts to fulfil EU law functions; systemic violation of EU obligation.
Article 47 CFR – Right to Effective Remedy & Fair Trial	Denial of access to an independent/impartial tribunal; manipulation of proceedings; obstruction preventing fair hearings; lack of effective remedies due to impunity.	Violation of individual fundamental rights; denial of justice; lack of accountability.
EU Anti-Corruption Law (e.g., proposed Directive)	Specific acts of bribery, trading in influence, abuse of function, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, potentially illicit enrichment by MoJ officials.	Criminal conduct pervasive within justice administration; impunity for corruption offences.
PIF Directive (2017/1371) / Art 325 TFEU	Failure to ensure effective investigation/prosecution of EU fraud due to MoJ interference/incapacity; shielding perpetrators; creating impunity for PIF offences.	EU financial interests unprotected; breach of obligation to combat fraud against EU budget; justification for conditionality.
Principle of Mutual Trust (AFSJ)	Creation of systemic deficiencies in justice system raising fundamental rights concerns; loss of confidence from other Member States’ judiciaries.	Paralysis of cross-border judicial cooperation (e.g., EAWs); fragmentation of AFSJ; undermining EU security.

9. Conclusion

The analysis presented in this report leads to the unequivocal conclusion that sustained, systemic corruption and obstruction of justice within a Member State’s Ministry of Justice represent a profound and multi-faceted violation of European Union law. Such a situation contravenes the foundational values upon which the Union is built, particularly the rule of law as enshrined in Article 2 TEU. It directly breaches the specific obligations imposed on Member States by Article 19(1) TEU to guarantee effective judicial protection through an independent judiciary, and simultaneously violates the fundamental rights of individuals to an effective remedy and a fair trial under Article 47 CFR.

Furthermore, the conduct involved likely constitutes specific criminal offences under EU anti-corruption frameworks and undermines the Member State’s duty to protect the EU’s financial interests under the PIF Directive and Article 325 TFEU. Critically, the resulting systemic deficiencies within the national justice system erode the mutual trust that is indispensable for judicial cooperation across the Union, thereby threatening the integrity and functionality of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

The threat posed by such a scenario is therefore undeniably systemic. It impacts not only the citizens and legal order of the Member State concerned but also the effective application of EU law, the protection of the Union’s budget, the functioning of the internal market which relies on legal certainty, and the viability of essential cross-border cooperation mechanisms. The gravity and breadth of these violations underscore the necessity for the European Union to employ its monitoring and enforcement mechanisms robustly. Addressing such deep-seated institutional corruption requires moving beyond dialogue towards more decisive action, potentially including infringement procedures and the application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, to uphold the Union’s foundational values, ensure the integrity of its legal framework, and maintain the trust necessary for its continued functioning. Failure to effectively confront such challenges risks undermining the credibility and coherence of the European Union as a community based on the rule of law.

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