Navigating Systemic Obstruction: Legal Avenues for Redress in the Absence of Conventional Legal Support

I. Executive Summary

Mr. Hans Smedema has sought intervention from the European Commission (EC) concerning grave allegations of systemic state corruption and obstruction of justice within the Netherlands. His complaint details a decades-long denial of legal representation and access to justice, implicating high-level figures. The Commission, in its communication of June 25, 2025, declined to intervene, asserting that the matter is “not related to the implementation of European Union law” and falls under the exclusive responsibility of the Member State for maintaining internal law and order. This position places Mr. Smedema in a particularly challenging predicament, as he reports being “not allowed to file charges, and not allowed any legal help from Lawyers,” a situation he describes as “absurd.”  

While the European Commission’s direct intervention in national criminal matters is indeed limited by the principle of subsidiarity, Mr. Smedema’s allegations of systemic rule of law breaches, denial of fundamental rights—particularly the right to an effective remedy and fair trial—and “State Capture” do touch upon core EU values and potentially engage broader EU mechanisms. The severe constraints of being denied legal representation and the ability to file charges necessitate the exploration of unconventional, non-judicial avenues. These include leveraging national whistleblower protection mechanisms, engaging international human rights complaint bodies, and utilizing EU institutional oversight channels, such as petitions to the European Parliament and complaints to the European Ombudsman. Strategic recommendations will focus on meticulously framing the issues as systemic failures that directly impact EU law and values, even in the absence of conventional legal representation. Success in these endeavors will depend on rigorous documentation and a strategic approach to presenting the case to bodies designed for individual complaints or systemic oversight rather than direct criminal prosecution.  

II. The European Commission’s Position and its Legal Basis

Analysis of the EC’s Communication and its Rationale for Non-Intervention

The European Commission’s letter to Mr. Smedema, dated June 25, 2025, explicitly states its rationale for declining further action: the matter is “not related to the implementation of European Union law,” and “Member States are solely responsible for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security”. This communication concludes that the Commission is “not empowered to intervene in this case” and, consequently, cannot “follow up further”. This position reflects a foundational principle of EU law, where national sovereignty over internal affairs, particularly in areas of criminal justice and law enforcement, is generally respected.  

The Principle of Subsidiarity and Member State Responsibility for Internal Law and Order

The European Union operates on the principle of conferred powers, meaning it can only act within the limits of the competences explicitly granted to it by the Member States in the Treaties. Internal security and law enforcement remain primarily national responsibilities. Statements from the Commission clarify that EU bodies, such as Europol, “cannot investigate autonomously nor lead police operations,” and that this responsibility “remains the EU countries’ responsibility”. The EU’s role in internal security is largely facilitative and cooperative, focusing on cross-border threats like cybercrime, terrorism, organized crime, and financial crime. The “ProtectEU” strategy, for instance, emphasizes coordinated action, information sharing, and building resilience against threats that operate across borders, but it does not grant the Commission direct policing or prosecutorial powers within a Member State’s domestic legal system.  

Limitations on the Commission’s Direct Intervention in National Justice Systems

The Commission’s primary enforcement tool, the infringement procedure under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), is utilized when a Member State fails to fulfill an obligation under EU law. While Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) enshrines core EU values such as the rule of law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Commission itself have clarified that Article 2 TEU “can only be invoked alongside other EU law provisions and within the material scope of EU” law. It cannot independently activate the scope of EU law or generate obligations where no underlying competence or legal basis exists.  

The case of Commission v Hungary (C-769/22) illustrates this legal nuance: despite the Commission initially pleading an “independent violation of Article 2 TEU,” it later clarified during the hearing that Article 2 TEU cannot expand the scope of EU law on its own. This means that even profound breaches of the rule of law within a Member State may not trigger direct EC action unless they can be tied to a clear violation of a specific EU directive, regulation, or treaty provision within a defined area of EU competence. This reveals a fundamental challenge: the burden is heavily on the complainant to establish a direct and specific link between alleged national failings and  

enforceable EU law, beyond a general appeal to values.

Furthermore, the Commission’s infringement procedures are primarily designed to address “systemic failures of compliance with EU law” and breaches with the “highest impact” on the general application of EU law, explicitly stating they are not for “remedy[ing] individual problems” or providing direct personal redress or compensation. This highlights a fundamental tension between the EU’s macro-level tools for state accountability and an individual’s micro-level experience of injustice. While Mr. Smedema’s allegations describe systemic issues, the EC’s rejection suggests that his individual case, despite its systemic implications, did not meet their internal criteria for initiating a broader enforcement action aimed at compelling Member States to comply with EU law generally, rather than providing personal compensation or direct intervention in a specific criminal case.  

III. The Allegations: Systemic State Obstruction, Corruption, and Rule of Law Violations in the Netherlands

Detailed Examination of Mr. Smedema’s Claims

Mr. Smedema’s detailed letter of May 26, 2025, presents a compelling narrative of alleged systemic state obstruction and corruption in the Netherlands. The complaint asserts a “decades-long systemic obstruction orchestrated by elements within the Dutch state” to protect high-level figures such as Joris Demmink and Jaap Duijs.  

The allegations include:

• Violations of the Rule of Law (Article 2 TEU): The complaint asserts that the alleged systemic corruption, misuse of public power, interference with judicial independence, active obstruction of justice, and fostering of impunity directly contradict the principle of the Rule of Law. This includes the alleged use of “State Security” as a shield since 1972 and a purported “Royal Special Decree” to protect perpetrators and obstruct justice. The EU defines the rule of law as a principle where all public powers act within legal constraints, in accordance with democracy and fundamental rights, under the control of independent and impartial courts, encompassing principles like legality, legal certainty, no abuse of power, and independent courts.  
• Denial of Fundamental Rights to an Effective Remedy and Fair Trial (Article 19 TEU, Article 47 CFR, Article 6 ECHR): A central and “tormenting theme” in the complaint is the alleged systematic denial of legal representation since as early as 1972 and consistently since 2000, with lawyers allegedly “forbidden from taking the case”. This directly implicates Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), which guarantees the right to an effective remedy and fair trial, including the possibility of being “advised, defended and represented” and access to legal aid. Article 19 TEU also requires Member States to guarantee effective judicial remedies. The alleged provision of false information to international courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), leading to a complaint’s rejection in 2005 or 2006 based on an incorrect finding of a lack of domestic exhaustion, is presented as a “cruel paradox” given the alleged denial of access to domestic remedies.  
• Systematic Obstruction of Investigations and Evidence: The complaint details specific instances, such as police officers (e.g., detective Haye Bruinsma) purportedly forbidden by the Ministry of Justice from filing official reports around 2004, and prosecutor Ruud Rosingh allegedly forced to relocate after investigating an alleged rape connected to the case in 1991. Crucial evidence, such as the “Frankfurt Dossier,” was allegedly discovered and erased around 1983, and all evidence is allegedly deleted or hidden by the state itself. This systematic suppression allegedly made it “impossible to gather the necessary proof internationally,” contributing to findings of “incoherent reasoning” by bodies like the EU Parliament in June 2021.  
• Contravention of EU Anti-Corruption Legal Frameworks: Systemic corruption within a Ministry of Justice, allegedly orchestrated by Demmink, with obstruction of justice as a significant offense, is argued to directly contravene EU anti-corruption efforts. The EU has a strong stance against corruption, viewing it as a threat to security, the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights, and is actively strengthening its legal framework, including a new Directive on combating corruption by criminal law.  
• Threat to EU Financial Interests and Mutual Trust: A Ministry of Justice allegedly plagued by systemic corruption is deemed incapable of effectively combating fraud against the EU budget (PIF Directive, Article 325 TFEU), potentially triggering the EU’s Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. Such systemic failures also erode the principle of mutual trust essential for cooperation within the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation specifically links breaches of rule of law principles to the protection of the EU budget and financial interests.  

Understanding “State Capture” in the EU Context

Mr. Smedema’s complaint explicitly uses the term “State Capture”. This concept is defined as a type of systematic corruption where “narrow interest groups take control of the institutions and processes through which public policy is made, directing public policy away from the public interest and instead shaping it to serve their own interests”. It is further described as “systemic political corruption in which politicians exploit their control over a country’s decision-making processes to their own advantage,” going “beyond petty corruption” to involve “a systemic abuse of state resources that gnaws away at checks and balances to the benefit of a ruling party”.  

Crucially, state capture is highlighted as “completely incompatible with EU membership” and a significant obstacle to EU enlargement, as the EU is “a union of laws and based on mutual and sincere cooperation” that demands “impartial use of government powers”. This directly aligns with Mr. Smedema’s assertion that the alleged “active subversion of justice by a Member State is the true violation, invalidating procedural defenses”.  

A critical aspect of Mr. Smedema’s complaint is the argument that the procedural barriers he faces—such as “incoherent reasoning” or “failure to exhaust domestic remedies”—are not his failings but “a direct and calculated outcome of the alleged state-orchestrated obstruction”. This perspective suggests that the state is actively creating the conditions that lead to procedural dismissals. The alleged systematic denial of legal aid and manipulation of evidence are presented as deliberate acts preventing a legally “coherent” argument or the exhaustion of domestic remedies. This represents a sophisticated legal argument that attempts to shift the responsibility for procedural deficiencies from the complainant to the alleged actions of the state. If this can be proven, it would undermine the legitimacy of any dismissal based on such procedural grounds.  

Furthermore, the complaint highlights that the alleged systemic failures and “untouchable” status of key figures “erode the principle of mutual trust essential for cooperation within the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)”. This extends beyond individual harm or direct financial implications, touching upon the foundational premise of EU legal cooperation. If a Member State’s justice system is compromised by “State Capture,” it undermines the ability of other Member States to trust its legal processes, such as in mutual recognition of judgments, extradition, or cross-border investigations. This transforms a seemingly national issue into a matter of fundamental concern for the entire Union’s functioning.  

IV. EU Mechanisms for Addressing Systemic Breaches: Applicability and Challenges

Infringement Procedures (Article 258 TFEU)

Infringement procedures are initiated by the Commission against a Member State for failing to fulfill obligations under EU law. The objective of these procedures is to align national laws and practices with EU law. However, it is important to note that these procedures are not designed to remedy individual problems or provide direct personal redress or compensation. Their purpose is to ensure the correct application of EU law generally. The Commission has broad discretion on whether to launch an infringement procedure, requiring “sufficient signs of a serious breach of EU law”.  

As previously discussed, Article 2 TEU, while foundational to the EU’s values, cannot serve as a standalone legal basis for infringement actions without a direct link to other specific EU law provisions or within the material scope of EU law. However, Article 2 TEU does guide interpretation and is a “binding legal standard” reinforced by Article 19(1) TEU. The ECJ has increasingly intervened where judicial independence is at risk, basing its case law on Article 19 TEU and Article 47 CFR, which are interpreted in light of Article 2 TEU. This suggests that if the alleged denial of an effective remedy and fair trial can be clearly linked to a systemic undermining of judicial independence, it could potentially fall within the scope of an infringement procedure.  

Article 7 TEU Procedure

Article 7 TEU is a serious procedure allowing for the possibility of suspending EU membership rights, such as voting rights in the Council of the European Union, if a country “seriously and persistently breaches the principles on which the EU is founded as defined in Article 2 of the Treaty”. These fundamental values include “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”.  

The process for activating Article 7 is highly political and legally demanding. It requires a reasoned proposal from one-third of Member States, the European Parliament, or the European Commission, followed by a four-fifths majority vote in the Council (with Parliament’s consent) to determine a “clear risk of a serious breach”. Sanctions, such as the suspension of voting rights, require a qualified majority. Article 7 has been triggered only twice in the EU’s history (against Poland and Hungary) , underscoring its exceptional nature and the extremely high political and legal threshold for its activation. It is considered a “last resort” for addressing severe, systemic threats to the rule of law within a Member State. The recent withdrawal of the procedure against Poland further illustrates its sensitivity and the need for sustained, demonstrable breaches.  

A fundamental challenge here is the high bar for systemic intervention versus an individual’s profound experience of injustice. The EU’s primary enforcement mechanisms are designed to address systemic, broad-scale breaches of EU law and values, not to provide direct individual redress. The thresholds for activating these mechanisms are exceptionally high. While Mr. Smedema’s allegations could theoretically trigger these mechanisms, the EC’s initial rejection suggests that the current framing did not sufficiently bridge this gap or meet the high evidential and procedural bar for systemic intervention from the Commission’s perspective.

Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation

In force since January 2021, the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation allows the EU to “take measures – for example suspension of payments or financial corrections – to protect the budget” when “breaches of the rule of law principles directly affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or of the financial interests of the Union in a sufficiently direct way”. This instrument complements other budget protection tools and is used if other procedures are less effective. The Commission monitors the situation using various sources, including its annual Rule of Law report, ECJ judgments, and reports from the EU’s anti-fraud office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).  

While the primary goal of this regulation is financial protection, its application requires a finding of rule of law breaches (e.g., legality, legal certainty, effective judicial protection, separation of powers, and equality before the law) that impact financial management. This could indirectly pressure a Member State to address systemic issues that affect its justice system’s integrity, as alleged by Mr. Smedema. It is important to note that the regulation explicitly states that “final recipients and beneficiaries of Union funds should continue to receive their payments, directly by the Member States concerned”. This mechanism does not provide direct individual compensation but aims to compel the state to maintain integrity in its financial management related to EU funds.  

EU Anti-Corruption Frameworks

The EU recognizes corruption as a “serious threat to the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights”. It is actively strengthening its legal framework, including a new Directive on combating corruption by criminal law, aiming to “update and harmonise EU rules on definitions and penalties for corruption offences” and placing a strong focus on prevention. This includes measures to combat “abuse of high level power or causing serious harm to societies” and ensuring national authorities have tools for “prevention, repression, investigation and prosecution of cases involving high level officials or gross misappropriation”. The EU aims to “strengthen the transparency of public procurement processes,” promote “whistleblower protections,” and ensure “public bodies should seek the highest standards of integrity, transparency and independence”. These efforts align with Mr. Smedema’s allegations of systemic corruption within a Ministry of Justice.  

A significant point of consideration is the interplay of EU values and specific competences. While Article 2 TEU values are foundational, the Commission and ECJ are cautious about using them as standalone grounds for intervention. However, the allegations in Mr. Smedema’s complaint touch upon specific areas where the EU  

does have competence and policy frameworks: anti-corruption , protection of EU financial interests , and fundamental rights like effective remedy (Article 47 CFR, Article 19 TEU). The ECJ has increasingly intervened when judicial independence is at risk. The EC’s initial rejection might stem from a perceived lack of  

direct link to a specific EU law as presented by Mr. Smedema, rather than a complete absence of EU competence. The alleged “systemic denial of legal representation” and “obstruction of investigations” directly undermine the right to an effective remedy (Article 47 CFR) and effective judicial protection (Article 19 TEU), which  

are within the material scope of EU law and have been grounds for infringement procedures. This suggests that a strategic approach would involve re-framing the complaint to explicitly and meticulously connect the alleged systemic obstruction (especially the denial of legal aid and manipulation of evidence) to specific violations of Article 19 TEU and Article 47 CFR. This argument would assert that these fundamental rights are being systematically denied  

in an area covered by EU law, thereby constituting a breach of specific Treaty obligations, not just a general violation of values.

V. Exploring Avenues Without Direct Legal Representation or Charge Filing

Given the constraints of being unable to file charges or access conventional legal help, alternative avenues must be explored. These mechanisms often operate outside the traditional criminal justice system but can provide significant platforms for scrutiny and accountability.

Whistleblower Protection Mechanisms

The EU Whistleblowing Directive (2019/1937) mandates “common minimum standards for secure, confidential reporting channels and strong protection against retaliation”. The Netherlands has implemented this through the Whistleblower Protection Act (Wet Bescherming Klokkenluiders), which partially entered into force on February 18, 2023.  

A significant change under this Act is that whistleblowers are not required to report internally first before reporting to relevant government authorities. They can report directly externally to “competent authorities” designated in the Act, such as the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), the Netherlands Data Protection Authority (AP), and the Dutch Central Bank. The Act applies broadly, covering organizations with 50 or more employees, and specifically entities in sectors like financial services and anti-money laundering, regardless of workforce size. It prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers, with a recent Supreme Court ruling placing the burden of proof on the employer to disprove a link between adverse treatment and whistleblowing.  

This mechanism directly counters the alleged “state obstruction” described by Mr. Smedema, where police and prosecutors were purportedly “forbidden” or “forced to relocate”. The Whistleblower Protection Act provides secure, confidential reporting channels and strong protection against retaliation , critically allowing external reporting without prior internal reporting. This design enables individuals to bypass precisely the kind of internal state obstruction Mr. Smedema describes. This avenue offers a formal, protected channel to bring forward documented evidence of wrongdoing, even if the internal system is compromised. The shift in the burden of proof regarding retaliation further strengthens the whistleblower’s position, making it more difficult for the state to dismiss or penalize the report.  

Crucially, the Netherlands is preparing an “aid scheme for the granting of legal aid and mediation” for (potential) reporters who get into conflict with their employer after reporting. This scheme was expected to enter into force mid-2024. While the scope of this legal aid appears limited to conflicts arising  

after a report, it represents a potential opening in the “no legal help” barrier. If a whistleblower, by making a report, were to face any form of retaliation or adverse action—which is plausible given the alleged systemic nature of the obstruction—they might then qualify for legal aid under this scheme. This shifts the possibility of obtaining legal assistance from a pre-emptive need to a reactive entitlement based on the consequences of whistleblowing.

The following table provides a summary of key provisions of the Dutch Whistleblower Protection Act:

International Human Rights Mechanisms

These mechanisms offer avenues for individuals to bring complaints of human rights violations against State parties.

• UN Treaty Bodies (e.g., Human Rights Committee): These are “quasi-judicial committees composed of independent experts” that examine complaints of human rights violations by State parties. A key advantage is that “You do not need to be a lawyer or even familiar with legal and technical terms to bring a complaint”. While legal advice can improve submissions, “legal aid is not provided under the procedures”. This makes them explicitly accessible for individuals without legal representation. A critical requirement is to demonstrate “steps you have taken to exhaust the remedies available in your country” or provide “evidence as to why domestic remedies are ineffective, unavailable or unreasonably prolonged”. This directly addresses Mr. Smedema’s “cruel paradox” argument. Complaints can allege any violation of the relevant treaty, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The outcome can be a determination from an international expert body supporting the claim of violation and an entitlement to a remedy.  
• European Court of Human Rights (ECHR): The ECHR, part of the Council of Europe (CoE), delivers judgments against Member States for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. Applicants “must try all possible means of seeking redress in their own country before applying to the European Court of Human Rights”. Applications must be made within six months of the final domestic court proceedings or the event giving rise to the violation if no proceedings were reasonable. Mr. Smedema’s prior 2005/2006 ECHR rejection due to alleged lack of domestic exhaustion underscores the importance of this criterion. While legal representation is common, the initial application can often be made by the individual. The ECHR addresses violations of rights in the Convention, such as the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) and the right to legal assistance. Outcomes can include judgments against Member States, potentially leading to “just satisfaction” (reparation) or “individual measures” to end adverse effects.  

The requirement for “exhaustion of domestic remedies” is the most significant procedural hurdle for both UN Treaty Bodies and the ECHR. Mr. Smedema explicitly states that the “Dutch state allegedly created the lack of domestic exhaustion and then used it as a shield” and that access to domestic remedies was “forbidden”. His prior ECHR complaint was rejected on this basis. Success in these international forums hinges on compellingly proving the “ineffectiveness, unavailability or unreasonably prolonged” nature of domestic remedies. This requires a detailed narrative of attempts to seek legal help and domestic redress, and the specific ways these attempts were allegedly thwarted. The “incoherent reasoning” finding by the EU Parliament might lend some external credibility to claims of systemic obstruction affecting the ability to present a case.  

The nature of UN Treaty Body mechanisms, described as “uncomplicated and accessible to the layperson” and explicitly stating that a lawyer is not required , directly addresses the “no lawyers” constraint. These mechanisms are designed for individuals to advocate for themselves by presenting clear, factual accounts. Their accessibility makes them potentially viable, provided the individual can clearly articulate the systematic nature of the alleged abuses and their impact on their rights.  

The following table provides a comparative overview of relevant international human rights complaint mechanisms:

Petitions to the European Parliament

EU citizens have the right to submit a petition to the European Parliament concerning the application of EU law. If a petition is admissible, the Parliament “may ask the Commission to conduct an investigation”. The Commission then assesses the request and replies to the Parliament. The European Parliament actively promotes and protects human rights, democracy, and the rule of law within the EU.  

While petitions to the European Parliament do not directly provide individual redress or trigger binding legal action in the same way as infringement procedures, they can prompt the Parliament to request an investigation from the Commission. The Parliament is a political body deeply engaged with rule of law and human rights concerns. Mr. Smedema’s complaint already mentions a finding of “incoherent reasoning” by the EU Parliament in June 2021 , suggesting prior engagement or awareness of his case. This mechanism serves as a “soft power” tool, allowing the case to be brought to a prominent EU political institution, potentially influencing the political agenda and increasing scrutiny on the Netherlands regarding rule of law issues. It can serve as a public platform and a way to keep the issue on the EU’s radar, even if the direct legal outcome is uncertain.  

Complaints to the European Ombudsman

If an individual believes that their complaint has not been adequately addressed by the European Commission, they may submit a complaint to the European Ombudsman. The Ombudsman investigates cases of maladministration by EU institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies. This could include how the Commission processed and dismissed the initial complaint, particularly if the dismissal is perceived as arbitrary or inadequately reasoned given the detailed allegations.  

While the Ombudsman cannot overturn the EC’s decision on the merits of the national case, they can investigate whether the EC followed proper procedures, adequately considered all information, and provided a sufficiently reasoned decision in dismissing the complaint. This offers a path to hold the Commission itself accountable for its administrative process. A finding of maladministration by the Ombudsman could lead to recommendations for the Commission to re-examine the complaint or improve its procedures for handling complex rule of law cases. It would not directly resolve the national issue but could compel the Commission to take a more thorough look, potentially prompting a re-evaluation of its initial stance.

Public Advocacy and Civil Society Engagement

Leveraging non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media can be a powerful strategy to raise awareness and exert pressure. NGOs often function as watchdogs, provide services to whistleblowers, and engage in anti-corruption advocacy. Organizations like Transparency International are actively pushing for stronger anti-corruption rules and public accountability in the EU. The Dutch Whistleblower Law mentions that a reporter “may also make a report public in certain circumstances, for instance through the press”.  

When formal legal avenues are constrained by the “no lawyers, no charges” situation, public exposure through media and civil society can amplify pressure. Mr. Smedema possesses a compelling, detailed narrative of alleged systemic abuse. The alleged “high-level political determination to maintain the ‘untouchable’ status” suggests that public scrutiny might be the only way to disrupt this entrenched power. This non-legal, but potentially highly effective, strategy allows the story to reach a wider audience, potentially generating public and political pressure that  

can influence legal and institutional responses. This approach requires careful consideration of personal safety and the potential for increased retaliation, but it offers a powerful means of influencing the narrative and creating external pressure for accountability. It can also help gather additional support or evidence, as NGOs often have investigative capacities or networks that can assist in building a more robust case for systemic change.

VI. Strategic Considerations and Recommendations for Mr. Smedema

Addressing the “Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies” Paradox in the Context of Alleged State Obstruction

The requirement to exhaust domestic remedies remains the most critical procedural hurdle for international human rights mechanisms. Mr. Smedema must meticulously document every attempt to seek domestic redress and legal assistance, and every instance where these avenues were allegedly blocked or undermined by state actors. His existing detailed complaint already lays a strong foundation for this argument, explicitly stating that the “Dutch state allegedly created the lack of domestic exhaustion and then used it as a shield”. It is imperative to provide concrete examples, such as specific lawyers allegedly forbidden from taking the case, dates of attempts to file charges, and official responses denying access. Referencing the EU Parliament’s finding of “incoherent reasoning” could support the claim that the systemic obstruction makes a coherent domestic case impossible, providing external validation for the narrative. Success in these international forums hinges on compellingly proving the “ineffectiveness, unavailability or unreasonably prolonged” nature of domestic remedies. This involves transforming the procedural barrier into evidence of the substantive violation itself.  

Prioritizing Mechanisms that Align with the User’s Constraints

Given the stated constraints of being denied legal representation and the ability to file charges, a strategic prioritization of available mechanisms is essential.

• Primary Focus: Individual communications to UN Treaty Bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee, and utilizing the Dutch Whistleblower Protection Act’s external reporting channels. These mechanisms explicitly allow for self-representation and provide protected reporting avenues for systemic issues.
• Secondary/Complementary: Petitions to the European Parliament and complaints to the European Ombudsman. These provide valuable oversight and avenues for political pressure without requiring legal representation.
• Supportive: Strategic engagement with reputable Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and media for public advocacy. This can amplify the message and exert broader pressure, especially when formal channels are blocked.

Guidance on Compiling and Presenting Evidence Effectively for Non-Judicial Bodies

Effective presentation of information is crucial, even in non-judicial settings.

• Structure and Clarity: The presentation should be logical, chronological, and clearly link alleged actions to specific rights violations or systemic failures. Use clear headings, bullet points, and concise paragraphs to enhance readability.
• Meticulous Documentation: Provide all available documentary evidence, including correspondence, official responses, records of attempts to seek legal aid, any prior court rejections, media reports, and internal documents if available. Even if evidence was “erased” , it is vital to document the attempts to obtain it and the alleged erasure, emphasizing the state’s role in its disappearance.  
• Focus on Systemic Impact: Frame the individual experience as illustrative of a broader, systemic issue that impacts the rule of law, fundamental rights, and potentially EU financial interests or mutual trust. Connect the alleged “State Capture” to the specific procedural barriers encountered.  
• Specificity: Avoid vague accusations. Provide names, dates, and specific actions as much as possible, as already done in the initial complaint (e.g., Joris Demmink, Jaap Duijs, Minister David van Weel, detective Haye Bruinsma, prosecutor Ruud Rosingh, “Frankfurt Dossier”).  

Managing Expectations Regarding Timelines and Outcomes

It is important to maintain realistic expectations regarding the timelines and potential outcomes of these processes. These avenues are often lengthy, spanning months or even years, and require significant patience and persistence. Direct personal compensation or immediate criminal charges against alleged perpetrators are highly unlikely outcomes from EU or international human rights bodies. Their primary goal is often a finding of violation, recommendations for systemic change, or political pressure on the Member State. Success should be measured in terms of recognition of the systemic issues, potential policy changes, increased scrutiny on the Member State, or a formal finding of a human rights violation, rather than immediate personal redress or criminal convictions.

VII. Conclusion

While the European Commission’s direct intervention in Mr. Smedema’s specific case is limited by its mandate and the principle of subsidiarity, he is not without options. The situation of being denied legal help and the ability to file charges, if indeed a result of systemic state obstruction, can be strategically addressed through alternative avenues. By meticulously documenting his experiences and framing them as systemic breaches of fundamental EU values and human rights, Mr. Smedema can leverage national whistleblower protections, international human rights mechanisms, and EU institutional oversight channels. These paths, while not offering immediate criminal redress, can lead to significant scrutiny, political pressure, and formal findings of violations that contribute to broader accountability. The journey will be challenging and require sustained effort, but by focusing on the systemic nature of the alleged abuses and utilizing the accessible mechanisms, Mr. Smedema can continue to pursue justice and contribute to upholding the rule of law within the European Union.