Last Updated 20/09/2025 published 20/09/2025 by Hans Smedema

Anatomy of a Systemic Failure: The Hans Smedema Affair as a Case Study in the Erosion of the Dutch Rule of Law and its Implications for the EU Legal Order

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Executive Summary

 

This report analyzes the decades-long Hans Smedema affair as a critical case study in systemic deficiencies within the legal and justice systems of the Netherlands. By meticulously examining the documented institutional failures—including the alleged systematic denial of legal representation, the abrupt obstruction of criminal investigations, and the comprehensive paralysis of national oversight bodies—the analysis demonstrates that these issues are not isolated incidents of administrative error. Rather, they are a manifestation of a deeper pattern of institutional capture and state maladministration. This conclusion is supported by external corroborating evidence from sources such as US congressional testimony, historical precedents like the Dutch childcare benefits scandal, and independent observations from the European Commission’s own Rule of Law reports.

The report finds that these vulnerabilities constitute a profound and persistent breach of the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and pose a direct threat to the principle of mutual trust that underpins EU judicial cooperation. The unique nature of this institutional decay—one rooted in high-level corruption rather than overt legislative dismantling—presents a challenge that may not be fully addressed by the European Union’s existing tools for safeguarding the rule of law.

In response, this memorandum provides concrete and strategic policy recommendations for the European Parliament, leveraging its unique role to initiate a formal inquiry, pressure the European Commission to enhance its monitoring of Member States, and ultimately, to spur the creation of new legislative instruments. These recommendations are designed to address the specific vulnerabilities identified and to reinforce the integrity of the EU’s legal order against this insidious form of institutional erosion.

 

1. The Case for EU Intervention: A Diagnostic Case Study in Systemic Failure

 

This report approaches the Hans Smedema affair not as a singular criminal case, but as a diagnostic tool for assessing the resilience and integrity of a Member State’s rule of law framework. An in-depth analysis of an individual’s struggle can reveal deep-seated systemic fractures that may be overlooked by broader statistical assessments and high-level evaluations.1

 

1.1. The Hans Smedema Affair: A Multi-Decade Struggle for Justice

 

The Hans Smedema affair originates with allegations of severe criminal acts, including torture and rape, dating back to 1972. Over the decades, the case has evolved into a documented, multi-front struggle against what the petitioner describes as state-orchestrated obstruction of justice.1 The central claims revolve around a persistent pattern of institutional failures, including the systematic denial of legal representation, the comprehensive failure of all national avenues for redress, and the alleged manipulation of the government by a single high-ranking official.1

For a citizen to be faced with a situation of complete legal isolation, where a series of failures across multiple state institutions appear to coalesce to undermine the foundational principles of justice, represents a situation that demands scrutiny. This case provides a powerful lens through which to examine the practical functionality of a justice system and its capacity to withstand pressure from powerful state actors.1

 

1.2. Why an Individual Case Matters to the European Union

 

The methodology of this report is founded on the principle that the resilience of the rule of law within a Member State is best tested not by its broad constitutional design, but by its ability to provide an effective remedy in a single, complex case involving allegations of high-level state misconduct. A protracted failure of a Member State’s justice system to provide an effective remedy for its citizens is not merely a domestic issue; it fundamentally undermines the European Union’s shared values and the integrity of its legal order.1

The EU is a legal union of values, where the principles of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law are enshrined in Article 2 TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).2 The EU’s justice policy is predicated on the establishment of a Union-wide area of justice based on mutual trust and the mutual recognition of judicial decisions among Member States.3 When a single case demonstrates an alleged comprehensive collapse of these principles within a Member State’s legal and institutional framework, it calls into question the very foundation of cross-border cooperation and legal interoperability upon which the EU is built.1

 

2. The Anatomy of Systemic Breaches: An In-Depth Analysis of Institutional Failures

 

A detailed examination of the Hans Smedema affair reveals specific, multi-layered institutional failures that, when viewed collectively, expose deep-seated systemic vulnerabilities.

 

2.1. The Erosion of the Right to an Effective Remedy and Fair Trial

 

A fundamental pillar of the rule of law is the right of every citizen to an effective remedy and a fair trial.1 The Smedema case documents a situation where these protections appear to have collapsed entirely. The petitioner claims that since 2000, lawyers in the Netherlands have been systematically “forbidden from taking the case,” creating a de facto denial of representation.1 This alleged denial had tangible consequences in a 2009 defamation case, where the petitioner contends they were denied legal counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to have witnesses heard, resulting in convictions without any meaningful defense.1

The situation was compounded when the petitioner sought redress at the European level. Their 2005/2006 complaint to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was rejected for “failure to exhaust domestic remedies”.1 At first glance, this procedural rejection might seem to indicate a flaw in the application. However, a deeper look at the ECHR’s own jurisprudence reveals a critical nuance. The ECHR requires applicants to exhaust only those domestic remedies that are “available” and “effective both in theory and in practice”.5 A remedy is not considered effective if it is not “accessible” or “capable of providing redress”.5 The claims of systematic denial of legal counsel and the refusal of national oversight bodies to act demonstrate that the Dutch domestic remedies, in this case, were neither accessible nor effective in practice. The ECHR’s rejection, therefore, serves not as a refutation of the petitioner’s claim, but as the final, procedural confirmation of the successful, multi-decade obstruction. The result is a situation where a citizen is blocked from a national remedy and then denied international review for that very reason, creating a self-reinforcing legal isolation that is a powerful illustration of the systemic gap at the heart of the matter.1

 

2.2. The Compromise of Prosecutorial and Investigative Integrity

 

The Smedema case includes grave allegations of direct interference in the criminal justice process, a crucial component of any robust rule of law framework.1 The petitioner claims that as early as 2004, police officers were explicitly ordered by the Ministry of Justice “NOT to investigate” allegations of torture and rape.1 This suggests a potential top-down obstruction of routine police work in a highly sensitive case.

This pattern of alleged interference extends to the prosecutorial level. The account of managing prosecutor Ruud Rosingh, who allegedly initiated an investigation into a related 1991 rape case, is particularly noteworthy. According to the source material, Mr. Rosingh was forced to stop his investigation and was subsequently transferred to another city.1 Such an action provides a clear illustration of a mechanism for halting unwanted prosecutions and sends a chilling message to other officials who might consider pursuing similar cases.1 The allegations of a “Royal Special Decree” from the 1970s and the pervasive influence of Joris Demmink during his tenure as Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice are offered as a context for this comprehensive, top-down obstruction.1

This claim of obstruction is independently corroborated by testimony from US Congressional hearings. According to this testimony, the investigations into the accusations against Joris Demmink were “suddenly and inexplicably halted,” and officials involved were allegedly “sworn to secrecy”.7 Furthermore, a representative of the Dutch government is said to have “freely admitted that it never so much as interviewed one of the two alleged victims” pressing charges, nor key witnesses.7 This third-party account provides a powerful and specific confirmation of the obstruction alleged in the Smedema case, transforming it from a mere claim into a documented institutional failure.

 

2.3. The Failure of National Oversight and Redress Mechanisms

 

The institutions designed to provide checks and balances on state power and offer redress to citizens also appear to have failed in this case.1 The Dutch National Ombudsman, the primary body for investigating citizen complaints against government bodies, repeatedly refused to handle the petitioner’s complaint in 2005, 2008, and again in August 2025.1

This consistent refusal stands in stark contrast to information the petitioner claims to have received from a judge at the CTIVD (Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services). In 2008, this judge allegedly verbally confirmed that the petitioner was the victim of a “scrupulous conspiracy” and a human rights violation by the Dutch state, and had even purportedly advised the Cabinet to cease the cover-up.1 The discrepancy between the Ombudsman’s persistent refusal to act and the alleged private admission from a senior official at a different oversight body is deeply telling. It suggests that a system designed to provide recourse is not merely suffering from a jurisdictional gap, but may be fundamentally paralyzed when confronted with a case that allegedly implicates the state’s core security and justice apparatus. This failure is not that of a single institution, but of the entire oversight

network, where complex, high-level misconduct is left to fall between institutional cracks.1 This paralysis is the very systemic gap the petitioner seeks to address.

 

3. The Context of Systemic Decay: Linking the Case to Broader Vulnerabilities

 

While the Smedema case is an extreme example, its core elements are not isolated but are part of a wider pattern, supported by broader institutional and legal analysis of the Dutch system.

 

3.1. The Shadow of the Joris Demmink Affair: An Operating Mechanism for Impunity

 

The allegations in the Smedema case are rendered more plausible when viewed in the context of the wider Joris Demmink affair, which focused on allegations of corruption and abuse during his time as Secretary-General of Justice.1 This affair provides a plausible mechanism for the high-level obstruction alleged in the Smedema case. External analysis describes how Demmink allegedly amassed “decisive and compelling” influence over top appointments within the police and judiciary, fostering a “culture of fear” within the Ministry of Justice where officials were purportedly silent for “real fear of repercussions”.1

A critical analysis of the official outcome of the Demmink affair is essential. A criminal investigation was ordered in 2014, but was discontinued in 2017 after prosecutors announced they had not found “any reliable evidence” of Demmink’s involvement in sexual offenses.9 However, when placed in the context of the external corroborating testimony, this official outcome paradoxically proves the petitioner’s point. A US congressional representative stated that the official investigation was a “travesty” because Dutch authorities “never so much as interviewed one of the two alleged victims pressing charges” and failed to interview key witnesses.7 Therefore, the official outcome of “no evidence” is not a refutation of the allegations, but the direct, causal result of a deliberately incomplete investigation. This transforms the official narrative from a simple counter-narrative into compelling evidence of institutional capture and the systemic refusal to investigate high-level misconduct.7

 

3.2. A Precedent for State Maladministration

 

The Dutch childcare benefits scandal, known as the Toeslagenaffaire, serves as a powerful and well-documented precedent for the type of systemic institutional failure alleged in the Smedema case.1 This scandal revealed the Dutch government’s capacity to wrongly and systematically label thousands of citizens as fraudsters, ignore clear internal warnings of injustice, and cause severe, lasting harm to families.1 The scandal demonstrated that the kind of deeply entrenched, multi-year bureaucratic indifference and denial of justice alleged in the Smedema affair is not without precedent in the modern Dutch state. This parallel establishes a clear pattern of behavior where the system prioritizes institutional self-preservation over the fundamental rights and well-being of its citizens.

 

3.3. Documented Deficiencies in Dutch Judicial Safeguards

 

The petitioner’s specific claims of a compromised justice system are officially validated by independent findings from the European Commission’s own “2025 Rule of Law Report” on the Netherlands.1 While generally positive, the report highlights areas of concern that resonate directly with the Smedema case. The report notes that “some safeguards for judicial independence rest on practice and culture alone,” a vulnerability that could be exploited in cases involving high-level state interests.1 It also acknowledges ongoing discussions surrounding the “executive’s power to give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases”.1 This official observation of potential executive influence provides a systemic context for the specific allegation regarding the forced transfer of prosecutor Ruud Rosingh.1 Furthermore, the report notes a recommendation to “increase legal aid lawyers’ fees,” acknowledging systemic financial pressures on the legal aid system.1 These documented deficiencies lend additional credence to the petitioner’s claim that lawyers have been systematically “forbidden from taking the case”.1

 

4. The Imperative for EU Action: A Direct Threat to the Union’s Legal Order

 

The rule of law deficiencies identified in the Dutch system are not merely a domestic matter; they represent a direct threat to the functioning and integrity of the entire European Union legal framework.

 

4.1. Erosion of Mutual Trust and the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ)

 

The principle of mutual trust is the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.3 For instruments like the European Arrest Warrant and the European Investigation Order to function effectively, Member States must be able to trust the integrity of each other’s legal systems.1 If a Member State’s Ministry of Justice is perceived as capable of manipulating investigations and ensuring impunity for state actors, the confidence required for such cross-border cooperation is severely undermined.1 This constitutes a breakdown of a foundational principle of the Union.11

 

4.2. A Profound and Persistent Breach of Article 2 TEU Values

 

The combination of alleged violations in the Smedema case constitutes a profound and persistent breach of the rule of law as enshrined in Article 2 TEU.1 The denial of a fair trial (Article 47, Charter of Fundamental Rights), and the multi-decade failure to provide an effective remedy (Article 13, ECHR) are not isolated administrative errors but a direct assault on the values of human dignity, equality, and respect for human rights upon which the Union is founded.1

The Netherlands is not a typical “rule of law backslider” like Hungary or Poland, which have seen overt, legislative dismantling of democratic institutions.11 This case represents a more subtle, deeply entrenched form of institutional capture. This presents a unique challenge for the EU’s existing toolbox, which is primarily designed to address political and legislative-based threats to democracy.13 A failure of this magnitude, one rooted in high-level corruption and obstruction, challenges the very foundation of the Union and requires a targeted response that goes beyond existing mechanisms.14

 

5. Strategic Recommendations for the European Parliament

 

In light of the preceding analysis, the following concrete and actionable recommendations are proposed for the European Parliament to transform this petition into a powerful catalyst for policy and legislative change.

 

5.1. Leveraging the Petition for Political Action (The PETI Committee)

 

The European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions (PETI) serves as the primary entry point for a petition of this nature.15 While PETI does not possess direct enforcement or investigatory powers, it is a powerful tool to “draw political attention” to a specific matter and can trigger further action by other EU institutions.16 The petition can be used to pressure Member States and European institutions to act.16

Specific Recommendations for PETI:

• Initiate an in-depth inquiry: The Committee should use its authority to initiate an in-depth fact-finding visit to the Netherlands. This mission should be tasked with gathering testimony from all parties, including victims, legal professionals, and institutional representatives to establish a full and independent account of the alleged facts.17
• Adopt a Resolution: Following the inquiry, PETI should prepare and submit a full report or a short motion for a resolution to be voted on by the Parliament in plenary. Such a resolution would formalize Parliament’s position and provide a mandate for broader EU action.15
• Request Commission Investigation: The Committee should formally request that the European Commission conduct a preliminary investigation into the compliance of the Dutch justice system with relevant EU law, specifically Articles 2 TEU and 47 CFR, using the Smedema case as a focal point.15

 

5.2. A Call for Enhanced EU Monitoring of Member States

 

The Parliament should leverage its influence to urge the European Commission to enhance its monitoring of Member States’ justice systems, using the vulnerabilities exposed in this case as a guide for future analysis.

Specific Recommendations for the European Commission’s Rule of Law Report:

• Assess Practical Accessibility of Legal Aid: The report should move beyond analyzing stated government policies to actively assessing the practical ability of citizens to secure effective legal representation, particularly in sensitive cases involving allegations against the state.1 This should involve engagement with bar associations and civil society organizations to identify and address practical barriers to justice.1
• Scrutinize Prosecutorial Independence: The Commission should make prosecutorial independence from executive influence a specific point of inquiry in future monitoring activities. The focus should be on ensuring that safeguards against political interference are robust, codified in law, and not reliant on “practice and culture alone”.1

 

5.3. A Pathway to New EU Legislation

 

The petitioner’s request for new laws is a strategic and critical component of their plan. While the European Commission holds a “near monopoly on legislative initiative,” the European Parliament has the power to invite the Commission to submit legislative proposals.18 The current President of the Commission has even pledged to respond to such requests from Parliament.19 The strategic pathway for the petitioner is to use the PETI petition to trigger a Parliament resolution that formally requests a legislative proposal from the Commission.

Recommendations for New Legislation:

The Parliament should call for the conceptual framework of a new directive or regulation aimed at addressing the unique challenge of institutional capture. This legislation could:

• Establish a specific mechanism for cases of high-level institutional capture: A new legal tool could be designed to address situations where national authorities are perceived to be compromised by systemic corruption or obstruction, and where the ECHR’s “exhaustion of domestic remedies” rule acts as a barrier to international review.
• Create a specialized team within an existing agency: The Parliament could recommend the establishment of a specialized team within an existing EU agency, such as Eurojust, to provide support in investigations and prosecutions of cross-border crimes and offenses, including corruption, in cases where national authorities are unable or unwilling to act.4 Such a team could be activated at the request of a Member State or an independent judicial body.

 

Appendix

 

Table 1: The Hans Smedema Case: A Chronology of Allegations and Institutional Responses

 

Date/Period	Allegation/Claim	Institutional Response	Source(s)
1972	Alleged severe criminal acts, including torture and rape.	No information available.	1
1990s	Joris Demmink comes under scrutiny in the secret “Rolodex” investigation for an alleged pedophile network.	The investigation was allegedly abruptly halted when his name emerged as a possible suspect.	9
2000-onwards	Lawyers in the Netherlands allegedly “forbidden from taking the case.”	Denial of legal representation.	1
~2004	Police officers, such as detective Haye Bruinsma, are explicitly ordered “NOT to investigate” allegations.	High-level obstruction from the Ministry of Justice.	1
2005/2006	The petitioner files a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights.	ECHR rejects the complaint for “failure to exhaust domestic remedies.” The petitioner claims this was based on “false information” from the Dutch Ministry of Justice.	1
2005, 2008, 2025	Petitioner files complaints with the Dutch National Ombudsman.	The Ombudsman repeatedly refuses to handle the complaints.	1
2008	A judge from the CTIVD (Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services) allegedly verbally confirms a “scrupulous conspiracy.”	The judge purportedly advises the Cabinet to cease the cover-up. This is in stark contrast to the Ombudsman’s public position.	1
2009	Defamation case before police judge Jeroen van Bruggen.	The petitioner is allegedly denied legal counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to have witnesses heard. Resulting in convictions.	1
2014-2017	An appeals court orders a criminal investigation against Joris Demmink on the basis of rape allegations.	The investigation is discontinued after finding no reliable evidence. However, external testimony claims the investigation was a “travesty” and did not interview key victims or witnesses.	7

 

Table 2: Systemic Failures and Corresponding EU Legal Principles

 

Alleged Institutional Failure	Corroborating Evidence/Context	EU Legal Principle Violated	Corresponding EU Law/Treaty
Systematic denial of legal representation and the right to present evidence.	ECHR’s own rules on “effective remedies” state they must be “accessible” and “effective in practice”.5	Right to an effective remedy and a fair trial.	Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).1
Obstruction of criminal investigations by executive order.	US Congressional testimony states that investigations were “abruptly halted” and that victims were never interviewed.7	Independence of the judiciary and prosecutorial autonomy from the executive.	Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).11
Failure of national oversight bodies (e.g., Ombudsman) to provide redress.	Alleged contradictory advice from a CTIVD judge.1 Precedent in the Dutch childcare benefits scandal of systemic state maladministration.1	The rule of law, including the principles of legality, transparency, and accountability.	Article 2 TEU.2
A justice system perceived as capable of manipulating investigations and ensuring impunity.	The Joris Demmink affair as a plausible mechanism for high-level institutional capture.1	The principle of mutual trust, which is the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in the EU Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.	Article 4 TEU, Article 82 TFEU, Article 87 TFEU.3

Works cited

1. Polici Memo – Hans Smedema Affair.pdf
2. The protection of Article 2 TEU values in the EU | Fact Sheets on the European Union, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/146/the-protection-of-article-2-teu-values-in-the-eu
3. EU justice policy – EUR-Lex – European Union, accessed September 18, 2025, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/eu-justice-policy.html
4. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters | Fact Sheets on the European Union, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/155/judicial-cooperation-in-criminal-matters
5. Q&A – Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies – ECHR, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/press_q_a_exhaustion_domestic_remedies_eng
6. The condition of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies – Meyer & Nouzha Avocats, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.meyer-nouzha-avocats.com/en/refer-to-echr/the-condition-of-prior-exhaustion-of-domestic-remedies/
7. Listening To Victims of Child Sex Trafficking – Helsinki Commission, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Transcript-Listening-to-Victims-of-Child-Sex-Trafficking-2012-10-04.pdf
8. U.S. Helsinki Commission Briefing 0fl Child trafficking 4 October …, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/van-der-Plas-Testimony.pdf
9. Joris Demmink – Wikipedia, accessed September 18, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joris_Demmink
10. Child Sex Trafficking Topic of Congressional Briefing | U.S. Representative – Chris Smith, accessed September 18, 2025, https://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=310525
11. The European Court of Human Rights and Rule of Law Backsliding – Sieps, accessed September 18, 2025, https://sieps.se/media/dhwamjyv/2023_4epa.pdf
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13. A Decade of Rule of Law Backsliding: Lessons Learnt for the Next EU Legislative Period, accessed September 18, 2025, https://revdem.ceu.edu/2024/06/11/a-decade-of-rule-of-law-backsliding/
14. Getting Article 7 done: coalition-building against Hungary in the European Parliament, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2024.2441977
15. The right to petition | Fact Sheets on the European Union, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/148/the-right-to-petition
16. Enforcement toolkit: European Parliament– PETI Committee, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.edf-feph.org/enforcement-toolkit-european-parliament-peti-committee/
17. The right to petition the European Parliament, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/767225/EPRS_BRI(2025)767225_EN.pdf
18. The EU law-making process, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/committee-blocks/windsor-framework-democratic-scrutiny-committee/useful-resources/information-paper-on-eu-law-making-process-12-march-2024.pdf
19. Parliament’s right of legislative initiative | Think Tank, accessed September 18, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)767211