Victim of the largest horrifying kafkaesque and orwellian (Royal) conspiracy in Netherlands history with KLM Co-Pilot King Willem Alexander corruptly blocking the American legal Asylum against the Netherlands I was offered on March 15th, 2017 in the air above Montana causing me more years of horrible suffering.
Legal Analysis: The Absolute Nullity of Concealment Contracts and Procedural Strategies in Dutch Administrative Law
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Last Updated 22/02/2026 published 22/02/2026 by Hans Smedema
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Legal Analysis: The Absolute Nullity of Concealment Contracts and Procedural Strategies in Dutch Administrative Law
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Introduction and Jurisdictional Scope of the Analysis
The intersection of private contract law, criminal obstruction, and public administrative law generates a highly complex jurisdictional matrix, particularly when clandestine agreements are utilized to permanently suppress evidence of severe capital offenses. The analytical focus of this comprehensive legal report is directed toward an extraordinary paradigm: the alleged establishment of a specific civil non-disclosure agreement, executed in late 1972 and January 1973, wherein family members, friends, and close associates were purportedly bribed with a sum of 20,000 Dutch guilders (NLG) to integrate into an organized concealment effort, characterized throughout the primary documentation as an “Omerta” organization. The core controversy surrounding this agreement is its draconian penalty clause, which dictates that any signatory who reveals the truth regarding the severe crimes committed against the appellant must repay the original 20,000 NLG accompanied by cumulative State interest, historically hovering around four percent. Decades later, this punitive financial mechanism translates to an alleged contemporary liability of approximately 70,000 EUR per signatory, creating a profound psychological and financial barrier to material truth-finding.1
The legal exigency of this analysis is driven by an upcoming judicial review at the Rechtbank Den Haag, team bestuursrecht (District Court of The Hague, Administrative Law Division). The appellant seeks victim compensation from the Dutch State via the Schadefonds Geweldsmisdrijven (Violent Crimes Compensation Fund, hereafter “CSG”). The CSG has formally rejected the application, maintaining its refusal through the objection (bezwaar) phase on February 17, 2026. The administrative rejection is predicated on a strict demand for conventional “objective information” originating from independent third parties, coupled with an absolute adherence to the temporal jurisdiction limit of the Wet schadefonds geweldsmisdrijven (Wsg), which excludes crimes committed prior to January 1, 1973.1 The appellant operates under a severe evidentiary deficit, lacking physical copies of the 1972/1973 concealment contracts. However, the appellant posits that the absence of standard objective evidence is not a failure of the claim, but rather the direct, calculated result of the illicit Omerta contracts which successfully purchased the silence of crucial witnesses, including Ans Schuh van Kesteren, Paul Schuh, and the appellant’s own spouse prior to their marriage on February 23, 1973.1
This exhaustive research report investigates the doctrinal and procedural dimensions required to dismantle the CSG’s rejection. The analysis first evaluates the civil law validity of a contract designed to conceal severe criminal acts under Article 3:40 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW), definitively establishing the absolute nullity of the agreement and its financial penalty clauses. Subsequently, the report transposes this private law reality into the realm of administrative procedural law (bestuursprocesrecht), exploring how the existence of such an illicit suppression mechanism generates a legally recognized state of evidentiary distress (bewijsnood). The analysis will demonstrate how this bewijsnood can be weaponized against the State under the Algemene wet bestuursrecht (Awb), particularly when the State relies upon an evidentiary vacuum that was created by criminal obstruction and allegedly tolerated by state actors. Finally, the report outlines a comprehensive procedural strategy for the Rechtbank Den Haag, detailing the mechanisms required to compel intimidated witnesses to testify by securing a judicial declaration regarding the nullity of the financial threats hanging over them.
The Factual Architecture and Mechanics of the Concealment Agreement
Before embarking on the doctrinal legal analysis, it is imperative to rigorously map the factual architecture upon which the legal arguments will be constructed. The legal consequences of any agreement are inextricably linked to its intent, its substantive content, and the specific historical context of its execution. The structural foundation of the appellant’s current evidentiary deficit is the alleged establishment of a highly organized, well-funded concealment effort, frequently described in the underlying documentation as an “Omerta organization” or a “Cordon Sanitaire”.1 In the temporal window encompassing late 1972 and early 1973, a coordinated bribery operation was allegedly executed to ensure the absolute suppression of information regarding severe crimes—including alleged forced medical interventions, drugging, and sexual violence—committed against the appellant and his partner.
The operational parameters of this arrangement are characterized by significant financial leverage and strict contractual obligations. The primary consideration for silence was a direct payment of approximately 20,000 NLG issued to key friends, family members, and associates.1 The capital required to facilitate these widespread payments was allegedly sourced via the Rabobank, facilitated by internal connections held by the family, specifically the father of the appellant’s partner who held a senior executive position within the banking institution.1 In exchange for these funds, the recipients were required to sign a civil contract that stipulated absolute, permanent silence regarding the crimes committed against the appellant.1
The most legally significant aspect of this civil contract is the severe penalty clause embedded within it. The agreement did not merely request confidentiality; it established a draconian enforcement mechanism. If any signatory breached the code of silence and revealed the truth to the appellant or to the authorities, they were legally bound to repay the original 20,000 NLG. Furthermore, this repayment was not static; it was explicitly tied to cumulative State interest rates, historically averaging around four percent per annum. Over the span of more than five decades, the power of compound interest has elevated this original penalty to a contemporary financial threat of approximately 70,000 EUR per individual.1 This massive financial liability serves as the primary psychological barrier preventing crucial witnesses from coming forward.
The timeline of these events is critical for both the civil and administrative legal analyses, particularly concerning the integration of specific individuals into the conspiracy. The table below outlines the specific chronological elements relevant to the execution and impact of the Omerta contract.
Chronological Milestone
Factual Description and Legal Relevance
Late 1972
Initial implementation of the “Omerta” bribery scheme. Friends and associates are approached with the 20,000 NLG offer funded via Rabobank connections. This period establishes the foundation of the conspiracy and the beginning of the continuous obstruction of justice.1
Late 1972 / Early 1973
Crucial witnesses, specifically identified as Ans Schuh van Kesteren and Paul Schuh from Alphen aan den Rijn, are allegedly integrated into the silence agreement. Despite early indications that Ans Schuh possessed knowledge of the abuse and considered alerting authorities, the financial leverage ultimately secured their permanent silence, establishing them as silent witnesses within the “Cordon Sanitaire”.1
January 1973
The temporal barrier established by the Wet schadefonds geweldsmisdrijven (Wsg) comes into effect. The CSG utilizes January 1, 1973, as the absolute cutoff for evaluating violent crimes. The execution of the concealment contracts spans across this barrier, creating a complex jurisdictional overlap.1
Prior to February 23, 1973
The appellant’s future spouse allegedly receives the 20,000 NLG payment without transparent explanation, integrating her into the Omerta organization before the official marriage ceremony. This pre-marital financial coercion establishes a continuous state of deception that permeated the entirety of the legal union.1
February 23, 1973
The official marriage of the appellant. The documentation alleges that anomalous signatures from Ministry of Justice officials were required during this ceremony, further intertwining the private concealment with alleged state participation and the establishment of a “secret guardianship” (geheime curatele).1
Present Day (2026)
The cumulative interest on the penalty clause reaches an estimated 70,000 EUR, continuing to actively suppress the testimony of surviving signatories and preventing the appellant from fulfilling the CSG’s demand for objective evidence.1
This factual architecture demonstrates that the appellant is not dealing with a mere lack of evidence due to the passage of time. Instead, the evidentiary vacuum is a highly engineered, financially enforced reality. The witnesses who could provide the “objective information” demanded by the CSG are actively paralyzed by the fear of invoking the 70,000 EUR penalty clause. Consequently, the primary objective for the administrative appeal is to dismantle the legal standing of this penalty clause, thereby liberating the witnesses to testify and shifting the burden of proof back to the State.
Private Law Analysis: The Absolute Nullity of Concealment Contracts
The primary substantive question underpinning this entire dispute is whether a civil contract that mandates absolute silence regarding severe criminal acts, and enforces that silence through a punitive financial mechanism, possesses any degree of legal validity under Dutch private law. The answer to this question must be unequivocally negative. To demonstrate this to the Rechtbank Den Haag, an exhaustive analysis of the foundational principles of Dutch contract law is required.
Article 3:40 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek)
The fundamental boundary of the freedom of contract in the Netherlands is codified in Article 3:40 of the Dutch Civil Code (BW). This provision acts as the ultimate safeguard of societal values within the realm of private law, ensuring that the coercive power of the State (via the civil court system) cannot be utilized to enforce agreements that undermine the legal order itself. Article 3:40 BW stipulates in its first paragraph that a legal act which, by its content or its necessary implication, is contrary to good morals or public order is strictly void. Furthermore, the second paragraph dictates that the violation of a mandatory statutory provision also results in the nullity of the legal act, unless the provision solely serves to protect one specific party, in which case it is merely voidable.2
The legal distinction between the “content” (inhoud) of a contract and its “implication” or “scope” (strekking) is of critical importance in this specific case. It is possible for a contract to possess neutral, superficially lawful content. For example, a contract might simply state: “Party A agrees to pay Party B the sum of 20,000 guilders, and in consideration of this payment, Party B agrees to maintain strict confidentiality regarding the personal affairs of Party C.” On its face, a non-disclosure agreement is a standard instrument in corporate and private law. However, if the underlying implication and true purpose of that confidentiality clause is the concealment of capital crimes—such as torture, rape, forced sterilization, or the unlawful deprivation of liberty—the contract violently collides with fundamental societal norms.
According to firmly established jurisprudence from the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), an immoral or illegal scope is entirely sufficient to render an agreement void under Article 3:40 BW.3 The nullity established by the first paragraph of Article 3:40 BW is absolute and operates van rechtswege (by operation of law). This means that it does not require one of the contracting parties to actively invoke a legal remedy to annul the contract (vernietigen). From a strictly legal perspective, an absolutely void contract never existed in the first place, and it is entirely incapable of invoking any legal consequences or obligations.2 The nullity applies erga omnes, working against everyone, including third parties, and a judge is required to apply this nullity ex officio (ambtshalve) if the facts establishing the contravention of public order become apparent during proceedings.
Defining “Good Morals” and “Public Order”
The terms “good morals” (goede zeden) and “public order” (openbare orde) are classic examples of open legal norms. They are not exhaustively defined by statute but are continually filled in and interpreted by the judiciary based on contemporary societal standards, morality, and the fundamental pillars of the constitutional state.2
Public order primarily pertains to the fundamental principles of the Dutch organizational and legal structure. According to the interpretations of the Supreme Court and leading legal literature, public order encompasses the entirety of fundamental principles concerning the essential interests of society, giving shape to the foundational ethical, legal, and economic frameworks upon which the State relies.6 Conversely, good morals generally refer to the unwritten, deeply held principles of social propriety and fundamental morality within the community.
A civil contract whose primary, intended purpose is to facilitate the evasion of justice by purchasing the silence of witnesses to severe crimes strikes at the very heart of the rule of law. The entire architecture of the Dutch legal system relies on the discovery, investigation, and prosecution of criminal offenses. A private agreement that monetizes the obstruction of justice fundamentally subverts the State’s monopoly on criminal investigation and violates the overriding societal imperative to protect victims of systemic violence.
A direct and highly instructive parallel can be drawn from the feitenrechtspraak (case law of the lower courts) regarding contracts involving criminal acts. For instance, an agreement wherein one party pays another a sum of money to commit a murder is immediately recognized by the courts as void from the outset for being contrary to good morals and public order, as the contract overtly obligates the commission of a severe statutory offense.7 By necessary logical extension, a contract that obligates a party to become an accessory after the fact, to conceal a severe crime, to withhold crucial evidence from authorities, or to actively participate in an organized cover-up (an “Omerta”), possesses an equally immoral and illegal scope.7 The law cannot differentiate between a contract that pays for the commission of a crime and a contract that pays for the permanent concealment of that same crime; both are antithetical to public order.
Application of the Esmilo/Mediq Framework
To systematize the judicial assessment of nullity regarding contracts that intersect with statutory prohibitions, the Dutch Supreme Court provided a definitive, multi-tiered framework in the landmark Esmilo/Mediq ruling (HR 1 June 2012, RvdW 2012, 765).8 When a civil contract obligates a party to perform an act forbidden by law, or possesses an inherently prohibited scope, the adjudicating judge must weigh four specific viewpoints (gezichtspunten) to determine definitively if the contract is void due to a conflict with public order.
The application of the Esmilo/Mediq criteria to the 1972/1973 Omerta contract yields a decisive legal conclusion regarding its validity. The table below details this systematic application.
Esmilo/Mediq Criteria
Application to the 1972/1973 “Omerta” Concealment Contract
1. Protected Interests (Welke belangen worden beschermd door de geschonden regel?)
The legal and moral rules against concealing severe crimes are designed to protect the most fundamental human rights, specifically physical integrity and autonomy. Furthermore, they protect the rule of law, the effective administration of criminal justice, and the victim’s absolute right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).1 The interests protected are of the highest conceivable order in a democratic society.
2. Fundamental Principles (Worden fundamentele beginselen geschonden?)
Yes, unequivocally. The act of shielding the perpetrators of severe violent crimes and deliberately silencing crucial witnesses through organized financial coercion violates the absolute foundation of the constitutional state.1 A legal system cannot simultaneously guarantee human rights while enforcing private contracts designed to hide the violation of those exact rights.
3. Awareness of Parties (Waren partijen zich bewust van de inbreuk?)
The factual parameters dictate that the parties signing the contract (family members, friends like Ans Schuh van Kesteren) were explicitly aware that they were receiving a massive financial windfall (20,000 NLG) specifically to hide criminal acts from the victim and the authorities. The very nature of an organized “zwijgcontract” (gag contract) implies a shared, acute awareness of the illicit secret being suppressed.1
4. Existing Sanctions (Voorziet de regel reeds in een sanctie?)
While the Dutch Penal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht, Sr) provides criminal sanctions for the predicate offenses and for active participation in a criminal organization (Article 140 Sr) 1, private law must apply the ultimate sanction of absolute nullity. If civil nullity were not applied, the civil courts could theoretically be used to enforce the penalty clause, thereby making the judiciary an active participant in the obstruction of justice.8
The exhaustive application of the Esmilo/Mediq parameters yields an unequivocal, unassailable conclusion: an agreement to accept 20,000 NLG in exchange for concealing systematic violence, rape, and forced legal subjugation is absolutely void (nietig) under Article 3:40 BW. The contract holds zero legal weight and cannot generate any enforceable obligations.
The Financial Penalty Clause and Restitution Mechanics
Having established the absolute nullity of the core agreement, the analysis must turn to the specific enforcement mechanism that currently terrorizes the witnesses: the financial penalty clause. Because the foundational contract is void van rechtswege (from the very outset), all ancillary clauses, including penalty clauses, confidentiality requirements, or restitution mechanisms, share this absolute nullity. The legal maxim accessorium sequitur principale ensures that the penalty cannot survive the death of the main obligation.
The mechanism described in the documentation—whereby Ans Schuh van Kesteren, Paul Schuh, or the appellant’s spouse would be legally forced to repay the original 20,000 NLG coupled with four percent cumulative State interest (amounting to an insurmountable 70,000 EUR today) if they ever speak the truth—is a complete legal phantom. The Dutch legal system will absolutely not lend its coercive judicial power to enforce a penalty clause specifically designed to punish a citizen for reporting a capital crime or for testifying truthfully in a court of law. Such a clause is not merely void under private law; attempting to enforce it through civil litigation or aggressive collection practices could readily constitute the criminal offenses of extortion (afpersing, Article 317 Sr) or coercion (dwang, Article 284 Sr).
However, a highly technical civil law question arises regarding the original payment itself. If the contract is void, the legal basis for the transfer of the 20,000 NLG evaporates. Under Dutch property and contract law, a payment made without a valid legal basis is classified as an undue payment (onverschuldigde betaling) governed by Article 6:203 BW. In standard civil commerce, an undue payment must be reversed, and the recipient is obligated to restitute the funds. This raises a theoretical danger: could the original payer (e.g., the estate of Johan Smedema or the Rabobank facilitators) bypass the void penalty clause and simply demand the 70,000 EUR back via a standard onverschuldigde betaling claim if a witness speaks?
Dutch civil jurisprudence provides a robust defense against this exact scenario. While the Netherlands does not apply the Roman law doctrine of nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans (no one shall be heard who invokes their own guilt) as an absolute statutory bar to restitution, the courts possess powerful mechanisms to block the return of funds paid for highly immoral purposes. This is historically known as the par delictum rule (in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis).
Under current Dutch law, a claim for restitution of a bribe or a payment made to facilitate a crime can be entirely blocked by invoking the restrictive operation of reasonableness and fairness (beperkende werking van de redelijkheid en billijkheid), codified in Article 6:2 paragraph 2 BW.7 Furthermore, Article 6:211 BW explicitly dictates that if a party has performed under a void contract, and the performance itself constitutes severely unacceptable behavior, the court can refuse restitution. A party who deliberately pays a massive bribe to permanently conceal a horrific crime cannot subsequently utilize the civil courts to demand their bribe back when the concealment ultimately fails. The law will simply leave the corrupt parties where it finds them, refusing to assist the instigator in recovering the instruments of their crime.
The conclusion regarding civil liability is absolute and must be communicated clearly: Any witness, including Ans Schuh van Kesteren, who fears financial ruin from breaking the 1972/1973 Omerta contract is suffering from a legally manufactured illusion. The contract is absolutely void. The penalty clause is void. Any claim for restitution based on undue payment would be blocked by the courts as contrary to reasonableness and fairness. The witnesses face zero civil financial liability for coming forward and testifying to the truth.
Administrative Law Intersection: The Schadefonds Framework
The establishment of the civil nullity of the contract is the foundational step, but the core dispute currently resides in public administrative law. The appellant must prepare a comprehensive appeal (beroepschrift) before the Rechtbank Den Haag, team bestuursrecht to overturn the CSG’s decision of February 17, 2026.1 To formulate a successful strategy, it is necessary to rigorously analyze the specific grounds the CSG utilized to reject the application, and contrast them with the legal realities of the Omerta conspiracy.
The CSG’s rejection relies heavily on two main pillars characteristic of Dutch administrative law regarding victim compensation:
The Burden of Proof and Objective Information: The CSG strictly enforces the principle that the applicant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate the plausibility (aannemelijkheid) of the claim.10 To meet this threshold, the CSG categorically demands “objective information” originating from independent third parties, such as police reports (proces-verbaal), judicial convictions, or reports from established relief organizations.1 Because the appellant’s dossier consists largely of self-reported facts, medical records lacking causative linkage to a specific crime, and heavily utilized AI-generated syntheses, the CSG deemed the application fundamentally unproven.1
The Temporal Barrier: The CSG enforces Article 23 of the Wet schadefonds geweldsmisdrijven (Wsg), which dictates that compensation can only be awarded for intentional violent crimes committed in the Netherlands after January 1, 1973. The CSG utilized this provision as an absolute shield to categorically exclude any substantive assessment of the foundational events occurring in 1972, including the alleged drugging, forced sterilization, and the initiation of the concealment conspiracy itself.1
The administrative judge at the Rechtbank Den Haag must be forced to confront a fundamental paradox: The CSG is rigidly demanding conventional objective evidence (like a 1972 police report) while entirely ignoring the appellant’s central premise that the very crime he is reporting included the execution of a highly funded, systematic cover-up designed specifically to prevent the creation of such objective evidence.
The table below contrasts the rigid administrative demands of the CSG with the counter-arguments based on the reality of the Omerta contract, forming the basis of the appellate strategy.
CSG Rejection Ground
Administrative Reality and Legal Counter-Argument
Demand for Police Reports / Official Files
The appellant cannot produce a police report from 1972 precisely because the 20,000 NLG Omerta contract paid potential reporters and witnesses to remain silent.1 Furthermore, the appellant alleges that existing police files in Utrecht were deliberately destroyed on orders from “higher up” to protect the conspiracy.1 Demanding a document that the perpetrators actively destroyed violates the principle of fair play.
Demand for Independent Witness Testimony
Independent witness testimonies are currently unavailable because crucial observers, such as Ans Schuh van Kesteren and Paul Schuh, are operating under the false, yet paralyzing, psychological belief that speaking will trigger the 70,000 EUR financial penalty clause.1 The lack of testimony is proof of the contract’s effectiveness, not proof that the crimes did not occur.
Rejection of AI-Generated Documents
While the CSG correctly notes that AI models utilize probability rather than independent fact-finding 1, the appellant’s reliance on these tools is a symptom of his extreme isolation and lack of legal representation, forced upon him by the “civil death” imposed by the conspiracy. The AI documents represent a desperate attempt to synthesize a massive, decades-long trauma in the absence of professional legal aid.
Negative Advice from Oversight Bodies (CTIVD, Tuchtcollege)
The CSG relies on the dismissal of complaints by the CTIVD and medical disciplinary boards.1 However, if the Omerta conspiracy successfully infiltrated or influenced state actors, or simply starved these oversight bodies of the necessary files, their negative findings are compromised. A medical board diagnosing “delusions” is exactly the intended outcome of a conspiracy designed to gaslight the victim into appearing insane to cover up the original crimes.1
Evidentiary Distress (Bewijsnood) and the Burden of Proof
In standard Dutch administrative law proceedings, the distribution of the burden of proof generally rests upon the party seeking a favorable decision—in this case, the applicant seeking compensation. However, this distribution is not absolute, and the Algemene wet bestuursrecht (Awb) contains critical pressure valves to prevent severe injustice. The most vital concept for the appellant’s case is the doctrine of bewijsnood (evidentiary distress or evidentiary impossibility).
Bewijsnood occurs when a party is practically, legally, or structurally incapable of obtaining the required evidence due to circumstances that fall entirely beyond their sphere of control. Extensive jurisprudence from the highest administrative courts demonstrates that when a party is genuinely trapped in a state of bewijsnood, the administrative judge possesses the authority and the mandate to intervene. The judge can mitigate the strict standard of proof, shift the evidentiary risk heavily toward the administrative body, or order independent judicial investigations to level the playing field.10
To successfully invoke the doctrine of bewijsnood before the Rechtbank Den Haag, the appellant must construct a compelling narrative demonstrating three elements:
That he has made the maximum possible effort to obtain the information, exhausting all reasonable avenues.11
That the absolute inability to obtain the standard evidence is structural and not due to his own negligence or delay.
That specific, identifiable external factors block access to the truth.
The invocation of the 1972/1973 Omerta contract is the ultimate proof of bewijsnood. The appellant’s argument is overwhelmingly potent: He is not failing to provide evidence; rather, the evidence has been systematically blockaded by a coordinated, well-funded criminal enterprise operating under the guise of civil non-disclosure agreements. The witnesses exist, the memories exist, but they are locked behind a psychological wall of financial terror created by the 70,000 EUR penalty threat.1 The CSG’s dismissal of the appellant’s overmacht (force majeure) argument by simply stating it was “not substantiated” 1 is a circular fallacy; he cannot substantiate the obstruction because the obstruction itself prevents him from gathering the substantiation.
Therefore, the primary tactical objective at the Rechtbank Den Haag is to substantiate the existence of this 1972/1973 contract through contextual, circumstantial, and compelled testimonial means. If the appellant can establish the mere existence of the 20,000 NLG payment structure, the state of bewijsnood is definitively proven, and the CSG’s entire basis for rejection collapses.
Using the Contract Against the State
The situation escalates from a private conspiracy to a matter of state liability when the appellant’s allegations regarding State involvement are integrated into the analysis. The underlying dossier makes severe claims of high-level state corruption, alleging the involvement of Ministry of Justice officials (specifically naming Joris Demmink), intelligence services (AIVD), and even the highest echelons of the State in maintaining this “Cordon Sanitaire” and facilitating the “secret guardianship” (geheime curatele).1
If the administrative judge finds any credible begin van bewijs (initial evidence) that State actors facilitated, tolerated, actively protected, or benefited from the Omerta organization, the administrative dynamics shift radically. The principle of equality of arms, enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), is severely compromised if the State litigates against a citizen while simultaneously hiding the evidence.
In specialized areas of administrative law, such as tax law, the concept of omkering en verzwaring van de bewijslast (reversal and aggravation of the burden of proof) is utilized when a party (often the taxpayer, but sometimes the state) severely fails in its information duties.13 While general administrative law is less rigid in applying formal reversals, the fundamental underlying principle applies with tremendous force: The State cannot legally, morally, or administratively enforce a strict evidentiary requirement against a citizen when the State itself has rendered that requirement impossible to fulfill through complicity or gross negligence in allowing a criminal cover-up to operate for fifty years. By presenting the Omerta contract, the appellant uses it against the State: it proves the State is relying on an evidentiary vacuum it helped create.
Information Asymmetry and Article 8:31 Awb
To operationalize the concept of bewijsnood and counter the State’s information monopoly, the appellant must strategically deploy specific provisions of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht (Awb). The Awb is designed to correct the inherent power and information asymmetry between a solitary citizen and the apparatus of the State.
Under Article 8:42 Awb, the administrative body (the CSG) is obligated to submit all documents pertaining to the case to the court.11 However, the most critical tool for the appellant is Article 8:31 Awb. This provision explicitly states that if a party fails to comply with an obligation to provide information, submit documents, or appear before the court, the administrative judge may draw the conclusions from that failure that they deem appropriate (kan de bestuursrechter daaruit de gevolgtrekkingen maken die hem geraden voorkomen).11
The appellant has consistently referenced the existence of highly classified files held by intelligence services (CIA and Dutch AIVD/BVD) and deliberately removed police files from Utrecht that document the 1972 abuses and the subsequent conspiracy.1 The appellant must formally and aggressively request the Rechtbank Den Haag to order the State to produce these specific files.
If the State refuses to produce these files, citing national security, claiming they are lost, or simply ignoring the court order, the appellant must immediately invoke Article 8:31 Awb. The argument is that the State’s refusal to provide the existing evidence of the 1972/1973 events justifies the court in drawing the ultimate adverse inference: assuming that the appellant’s factual matrix regarding the Omerta, the 20,000 NLG bribes, and the severe abuses is entirely correct. Article 8:31 Awb is the specific procedural mechanism to flip the evidentiary risk onto the CSG when the State controls, but hides, the archives.
Bypassing the Temporal Barrier: The Continuous Offense Doctrine
The second insurmountable barrier erected by the CSG is Article 23 of the Wsg, which strictly limits compensation to crimes committed after January 1, 1973.1 Because the appellant’s most severe foundational traumas—the alleged forced sterilization, the initial drugging, the rapes, and the very initiation of the 20,000 NLG bribery scheme—began in 1972, the CSG categorically dismissed them.1
A strict textual application of this temporal limit leads to an automatic rejection. However, the appellant possesses a robust, highly technical counter-argument deeply rooted in the intersection of Dutch criminal and administrative jurisprudence: the doctrine of the continuous act or continuing offense (voortgezette handeling or voortdurend delict).1
While the initial acts of physical violence may have occurred in 1972, the criminal enterprise did not end there. The creation of the “Omerta organization” in late 1972 and January 1973 to silence witnesses, combined with the execution of a “secret curatele” (guardianship) 1, fundamentally transformed a singular historical crime into an ongoing, daily state of unlawful subjugation. The offenses of unlawful deprivation of liberty (Article 282 Sr) and active participation in a criminal organization (Article 140 Sr) are widely recognized in Dutch law as voortdurende delicten (continuing offenses).1
The crime is not locked in 1972; it is being actively committed every single day the victim is kept in a state of “civil death,” and every single day the Omerta contract is utilized as a psychological weapon to threaten witnesses like Ans Schuh van Kesteren into silence. Because the criminal organization and the continuous deprivation of liberty extended well past the January 1, 1973 boundary—and allegedly persist actively into the present day (2025/2026)—the CSG’s reliance on the temporal barrier is legally flawed and profoundly unjust. The administrative judge must be compelled to evaluate the entirety of the continuing offense, not merely its historical genesis.
Application of the Hardship Clause (Hardheidsclausule)
To further neutralize the temporal barrier, the appellant invoked the hardship clause (hardheidsclausule), arguing that the State’s extraordinary obstruction warrants an exception. The CSG rejected this, arguing that the hardship clause only applies to deviations from the Act itself, not to the fundamental assessment of whether a crime is “plausible”.1
At the Rechtbank Den Haag, the appellant must argue that the CSG’s interpretation of the hardship clause is overly restrictive and violates the principles of good administration. The hardheidsclausule in administrative law is precisely engineered for exceptional, unforeseen situations where the strict application of statutory rules leads to an outcome of disproportionate unreasonableness (onevenredigheid). If a victim can demonstrate that their inability to meet the Jan 1, 1973 cutoff, or their inability to provide standard evidence, is caused by a massive, partially state-tolerated conspiracy of silence fueled by 20,000 NLG bribes, holding them rigidly to those statutory barriers is the absolute epitome of unreasonableness.
Procedural Strategy at the Rechtbank Den Haag: Compelling the Witnesses
The exhaustive theoretical establishment of the contract’s nullity and the state of bewijsnood is ultimately meaningless unless it is translated into aggressive procedural action. The entire success of the appellant’s case hinges on a singular tactical objective: converting terrified, silenced observers into active, testifying witnesses.
The primary obstacle blocking this objective is not legal; it is purely psychological. Witnesses like Ans Schuh van Kesteren, Paul Schuh, and even the appellant’s own spouse, operate under the paralyzing assumption that the civil contract they signed in 1972/1973 is binding. The looming threat of a 70,000 EUR financial penalty is a profound deterrent that effectively guarantees their silence.1 The appellant must utilize the authority of the Rechtbank Den Haag to shatter this psychological illusion.
Requesting a Witness Summons under Article 8:60 Awb
In Dutch administrative proceedings, a party has the right to bring witnesses or experts to the hearing, or to formally request the court to officially summon them under Article 8:60 Awb. The appellant must formally and urgently petition the Rechtbank Den Haag to officially summon Ans Schuh van Kesteren, Paul Schuh, and the appellant’s spouse to appear at the hearing and testify under oath. The inclusion of the spouse is particularly critical, given the allegation that she received the 20,000 NLG and was integrated into the Omerta before the marriage on February 23, 1973, which potentially circumvents certain spousal privileges or complicates her involvement in the conspiracy.1
The Strategy at the Hearing:
Preliminary Judicial Declaration of Nullity: The appellant must submit a preliminary motion requesting the administrative judge to explicitly and formally clarify the legal status of the confidentiality agreements to the summoned witnesses prior to their testimony. The judge must inform them that any contract signed in 1972/1973 regarding the concealment of these crimes is absolutely void (nietig) under Article 3:40 BW.
Removal of Fear through Judicial Authority: The administrative judge, acting in their statutory capacity to seek the material truth (materiële waarheidsvinding), has the profound authority—and arguably the moral and legal duty—to inform terrified witnesses that they face zero civil liability for speaking the truth. Hearing this directly from a judge of the Rechtbank Den Haag is the only mechanism capable of neutralizing the 50-year fear of the 70,000 EUR penalty.
The Subpoena Power and the Duty to Testify: If officially summoned by the court, a witness is generally obligated by law to appear and testify truthfully. While close family members possess a right to decline testimony (verschoningsrecht), this privilege does not extend to friends or associates like the Schuh family.
If the court successfully summons Ans Schuh van Kesteren and legally instructs her that the 20,000 NLG contract is a phantom, the “Omerta” is structurally and permanently breached. Even in the worst-case scenario where she still refuses to speak out of ingrained fear, the appellant can utilize her terrified demeanor and her refusal as definitive, observable proof of bewijsnood, forcing the court to weigh this obstruction heavily against the CSG’s rigid demand for objective documentation.
Synthesis of Arguments for the Court Appeal (Beroepschrift)
To successfully navigate the upcoming court case at the Rechtbank Den Haag, team bestuursrecht, the appellant’s legal argumentation must seamlessly integrate the civil nullity of the contract into a devastating administrative procedural weapon. The following represents a synthesis of the optimal, multi-layered legal posture to be presented in the beroepschrift:
Phase 1: Establish the Civil Nullity (The Legal Shield)
The appellant must explicitly outline to the court that the 1972/1973 contracts, which distributed 20,000 NLG bribes to conceal capital crimes, are absolutely void (nietig van rechtswege) under Article 3:40 BW. The court must be shown that the agreement violently contradicts public order and good morals under the Esmilo/Mediq framework. The penalty clause (the 70,000 EUR repayment threat) must be exposed as a legally unenforceable mechanism of extortion.
Phase 2: Establish Bewijsnood (The Procedural Sword)
The appellant must argue that the CSG’s demand for standard “objective information” (police reports, external medical confirmations) is legally flawed and violates fair play under these specific, extreme circumstances. The appellant is in severe bewijsnood. The existence of the void Omerta contract proves that the lack of conventional evidence is not a failure of the claim, but the very manifestation of the crime itself. The cover-up succeeded in preventing the creation of objective files; the CSG cannot now use that success against the victim.
Phase 3: Shift the Evidentiary Burden via the Awb
Because the appellant is in bewijsnood—exacerbated by alleged State complicity in allowing a “secret guardianship” to persist for decades—the strict burden of proof must be relaxed. The Rechtbank must be formally requested to apply Article 8:31 Awb, drawing adverse inferences against the State for failing to produce destroyed or classified intelligence files, or alternatively, to accept the appellant’s detailed matrix of facts as sufficiently plausible given the state-engineered impossibility of standard verification.
Phase 4: Neutralize the Temporal Barrier
The CSG’s reliance on the January 1, 1973 cutoff must be entirely dismantled using the voortgezette handeling (continuous act) doctrine. The court must be shown that the crimes initiated in 1972 evolved into a continuous criminal organization (Article 140 Sr) and an ongoing unlawful deprivation of liberty (Article 282 Sr) extending well past 1973 into the present day. The temporal barrier is inapplicable to ongoing offenses.
Phase 5: Execute the Witness Strategy
The appellant must formally demand the Rechtbank Den Haag to summon Ans Schuh van Kesteren, Paul Schuh, and the spouse under Article 8:60 Awb. The appellant must petition the presiding judge to actively inform these witnesses that their non-disclosure agreements are void under Article 3:40 BW, thereby removing the fear of the 70,000 EUR penalty and clearing the path for material truth-finding.
Conclusion
The factual scenario presented in the Smedema dossier outlines a profound and disturbing collision between private suppression and public justice. The 1972/1973 civil agreements, which allegedly distributed 20,000 guilders to secure silence regarding horrific crimes under the permanent threat of punitive financial restitution, hold absolutely zero legal validity. Under Article 3:40 of the Dutch Civil Code, agreements that possess an immoral scope intended to obstruct criminal justice are void by operation of law from the moment of their inception. The 70,000 EUR threat currently paralyzing witnesses is a legally unenforceable mechanism of coercion that no Dutch court would ever uphold.
However, the psychological efficacy of this void contract has generated a profound, decades-long state of evidentiary distress (bewijsnood) for the appellant. The Schadefonds Geweldsmisdrijven has functionally weaponized this lack of evidence to deny the claim, applying rigid, standard criteria of “objective information” to a situation defined by extraordinary, organized obstruction.
The upcoming proceedings at the Rechtbank Den Haag, team bestuursrecht represent the critical juncture where this deadlock must be broken. The civil nullity of the contract must be used to dismantle the administrative rejection. By demonstrating that the Omerta contract is the direct cause of the bewijsnood, by invoking the continuous nature of the crime to bypass the 1973 temporal barrier, and by utilizing the powers of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht to compel and legally reassure intimidated witnesses like Ans Schuh van Kesteren, the appellant can shift the burden of proof. The administrative judge is uniquely empowered to look beyond the superficial lack of police reports, recognize the structural obstruction of justice, and dismantle the 50-year conspiracy of silence, thereby providing a pathway to compensation, accountability, and the ultimate exposure of the truth.
High level Dutch man(Rotary member) who became the victim of an unbelievable conspiracy set up by a criminal organisation of rapist inside the Ministry of Justice. Making me De Facto Stateless! Now fighting for 24 years but the Dutch government and specific corrupt King refuse to open an investigation to protect themselves! America investigated after my asylum request and started an UNCAT or special procedure in 2017.
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